

Human Mobility, Shared Opportunities

A Review of the 2009 Human Development Report and the Way Ahead





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Foreword by Achim Steiner, UNDP Administrator

For the first time since World War II, human mobility is on hold. Before the COVID-19 pandemic hit, ours was a generation defined by the constant movement of people—by choice or by force—across communities, countries, and continents. Whether they travelled in the pursuit of progress, as an escape from pain, or were forced from their homes by brutality, conflict or crisis, people’s movement—within and across borders—created the stained-glass societies we live in today.

Now, global human development—a combination of the world’s education, health and income—is set to decline in 2020 for the first time since this measurement began. These past months have reaffirmed migrants’ extraordinary contributions to society—as health and care professionals on the front lines; as essential workers in their communities. But with scarce jobs, limited access to social safety nets, and the threat of xenophobia, stigma and discrimination, they are also amongst the hardest hit.

The ‘great pause’ triggered by COVID-19 will—we hope—soon be over, but it raises an important question: how will this generational pandemic, alongside growing inequalities, and the climate crisis, affect human mobility? Will the international community seize the opportunity it presents to build forward better, or succumb to the temptation to raise more barriers, curbing avenues for shared opportunities? This is the question at the heart of this new report, *Human Mobility, Shared Opportunities*.

A decade ago, at the height of the global financial crisis, UNDP explored a similar question. The 2009 Human Development Report asked: “*Will the economic crisis raise protectionist barriers against immigration, or will it serve as an opportunity to re-think the role of movement in fostering social and economic progress?*” It analyzed the ways in which, in an unequal world, human mobility is a fundamental driver—and consequence—of development.

Since then, as the authors set out, international migrants have become increasingly skilled, but little progress has been made in addressing the mobility of low-skilled migrants. Migrants' rights are more protected on paper, but their access to social protection and services is still limited—legally and practically—in most countries. And transaction costs for documents, travel and money transfer remain stubbornly high. It has been a journey of two steps forward, one step back.


At the same time, new approaches are opening up to enhance the benefits of human mobility not only for migrants and their families, but also for countries of origin and destination. The last decade has seen the emergence of creative efforts to expand legal migration pathways—including through circular mobility schemes, digital innovations to help people earn a living on the move, a renewed focus on social protection and on the active participation of migrants and diasporas in the policies and programmes of countries of origin, both at national and local levels.

When UNDP shone a spotlight on human mobility in 2009, it was not yet at the top of the international agenda. It was treated, when discussed, as a problem to be solved rather than a phenomenon to be understood, managed and leveraged to accelerate human development.

Today's context is very different. The need to fight xenophobia, discrimination and exclusion, and promote cohesion as part of a new social contract is more important than ever.

With the International Organization on Migration (IOM) joining the UN family and the creation of the UN Network on Migration; with the creation of two Global Compacts on Migration and Refugees, and—most importantly—with Agenda 2030 and the Sustainable Development Goals, and the commitment they represent, we have a solid international architecture for collaboration to deliver on the development gains of human mobility.

It is time to build forward better, together. This report offers insights as into how.



Achim Steiner
UNDP Administrator

Message by António Vitorino, Director-General, IOM

The 2009 Human Development Report (HDR) shed necessary light on the important and complex relationship between human mobility and development. Challenging some common, though often misinformed assumptions, the Report sought to “overcome barriers” and offer a package of proposed reforms with a view to expanding people’s freedoms and amplifying the positive effects of human mobility on human development. A decade later, as the world faces the grim reality that we are not on track to meet the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and as we grapple with the COVID-19 pandemic, it is both timely and imperative to revisit the 2009 HDR and take stock within the context of our current reality.

Migration is a global phenomenon shaping our world at every turn and touching all of our lives. Migrants help provide the building blocks for prosperous societies bringing knowledge, support, networks, and skills in countries of origin, transit and destination. Yet the

development benefits of migration are not guaranteed. Positive outcomes depend on having conducive social, cultural, political and economic structures in place. Global trends such as shifting demographics, persistent inequalities, rapid urbanization, digitalization, environmental and climate change, conflict and violence shape development outcomes.

Our reliance on the movement of people has only become more apparent with COVID-19. Migrants are on the front lines of COVID-19 response providing essential services and powering our economies. Paradoxically, the mobility restrictions enforced around the world to control the transmission of COVID-19 have deprived many migrants of their livelihoods and left thousands stranded or in precarious situations, triggering serious concerns for the preservation of their rights and wellbeing. In turn, this has created direct knock-on effects across communities and in the wider world economy.

Our ability to *recover better* and get back on track to meet the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) requires urgent and bold action to overcome remaining barriers to enhance human mobility contributions to sustainable development.

Over the last 10 years, the global discourse and international architecture framing migration governance have changed dramatically providing new impetus to strengthen the positive relationship between migration and sustainable development. The 2030 Agenda recognizes migration as a cross-cutting issue to sustainable development and acknowledges that the promise to *leave no one behind* requires the full inclusion of migrants. Anchored in the 2030 Agenda, the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) sets forth a common vision to help achieve the migration dimensions of the SDGs and inform COVID-19 socio-economic recovery efforts.

IOM's entry into the UN system brought new opportunity for increased partnership on migration.

As coordinator and secretariat of the UN Network on Migration (UNNM), IOM is pursuing a UN system-wide approach to ensure that the activities of the UN and its partners maximize the development potential of migration, including to ensure that migrants and migration are considered at every step of UN Country Team planning to connect GCM implementation with the pursuit of the SDGs.

We welcome this Report as an important reflection on our progress today, and to inspire action moving forward.



António Vitorino
Director-General, IOM and Coordinator
of the UN Network on Migration



UNDP/Karin Scherbrucker for Slingshot

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Executive summary

This report looks back and connects UNDP's Human Development Report (HDR) of 2009 to ongoing trends and emerging issues a decade later. The 2009 HDR was the first major report to look at people's mobility through the lens of human development and propose a package of reforms to further migration-related human freedoms. Since its publication, mobility has gained recognition as a central component of development, but has also generated controversy as the number of people on the move has grown, and the politics of migration has turned negative in many countries. The report explores policy ideas associated with the HDR that could improve international responses to migration and displacement, enhancing the contributions of human mobility to sustainable development.

Chapter 2 discusses both patterns and trends in migration, showing some continuity with the 2009 HDR and some trends that represent divergence or a sharp acceleration. Among the former are population aging

on a global basis (particularly in more industrialized economies), the high proportion of women among international migrants, and the predominance of migration within countries rather than across national boundaries (although poor data continue to limit understanding of internal migration). Major changes include the numbers of refugees and internally displaced people, which reached an all-time high of about 70 million in 2019, and the increasing number of people compelled to move due to climate change. Awareness has grown of the particular challenges migrant women face, such as employment in the least visible sectors of the economy, including household employment, as well as continuing unequal constraints on their freedom of movement. In some contexts, however (Western Europe, for example) women migrants achieve better overall outcomes than men.

Global patterns of migration show, as might be expected, that the majority—almost three quarters—of

migrants continue to move to countries that rank very high on the Human Development Index (HDI). Migrants who move from low to higher HDI countries make great gains in terms of income, as well as health, education and safety. However, both within and across countries, it is typically not the poorest who move. Higher incomes and education give people the means to move as well as access to the networks and knowledge that facilitate migration.

Despite the accumulating evidence that migration brings gains for migrants and their families, as well as for countries of origin and destination, public discourse on migration (especially in host countries) has become increasingly polarized and, often, negative. Facts are often insufficient and even ignored to alter strongly held views, although people with direct personal experience with immigrants tend to have more positive feelings. It is important to understand and address the sources of concern, whether based in material changes or in attitudes and emotions, and to counter xenophobic rhetoric used to manipulate electoral politics.

The six pillars of HDR 2009 together presented an integrated package of reforms to increase the benefits of migration for human development. Chapter 3 considers how subsequent policy innovations (or the lack thereof) have moved toward or away from the 2009 proposals:

- The expansion of legal pathways for migration (Pillar I) has proceeded through regional mobility agreements such as in the European Union, the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) and the Economic

Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the increasing number of migrants with dual nationality or legal permanent residence. Little progress has been made, however, in visa liberalization for low-skilled migrants. In fact, skill levels of international migrants have been increasing and policy changes increasingly favour people with skills or wealth.

- Protection of the rights of migrants (Pillar II) has progressed on paper, but implementation is increasingly flawed. Migrants' access to services and social protection is limited legally and in practice in most countries.
- Transaction costs (Pillar III), for documents, travel and money transfer remain stubbornly high. In low-income countries, 45 percent of women and 30 percent of men do not have an official identity document.
- Pillar IV highlights the growing number of studies that show that migration is usually a win-win situation for migrants and host communities—and the world economy at large. The public discourse, however, has turned sharply negative in many countries of destination.
- Another welcome development is that restrictions on internal mobility (Pillar V) had diminished in the 2010–2019 period (prior to COVID-19), with very few countries maintaining formal restrictions, although informal barriers may persist.
- At both national and international levels, migration has been mainstreamed into national and local development strategies (Pillar VI), with governments, especially of countries of origin, increasingly recognizing the development potential of migration, and implementing programmes to mobilize their diasporas and create opportunities for more

productive uses of remittances. Powerful structural obstacles to the development potential remain, however.

Chapter 4 examines the ways global migration policy frameworks have evolved over the decade, culminating in the adoption in 2018 of two Global Compacts, on refugees and for safe, orderly and regular migration. Both were adopted by an overwhelming majority of States in the UN General Assembly. Although neither is legally binding, both compacts embody a commitment for States to pursue a broad set of objectives on international migration. In 2019, the UN Secretary-General established a high-level panel to find solutions for internally displaced people and their host communities. A more inclusive agenda-setting process involving civil society, local authorities and the private sector, pioneered by the Global Forum on Migration and Development, augmented the efforts of States to arrive at new policy frameworks.

The articulation of new policy frameworks was accompanied by structural changes in the UN system, notably the inclusion of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) as a related agency of the UN. As part of the broader UN reform effort, the Secretary-General established a UN Network on Migration involving all the UN agencies with migration portfolios, as well as other stakeholders, with IOM in the coordinating role. As the migration agenda evolved, so has the global development agenda. Migration has been recognized as a powerful enabler of development, although still not a substitute for sound development policy.

Human development as a concept with intrinsic as well as instrumental value has been more widely acknowledged since the 2009 HDR was published. Chapter 5 looks at the continuing relevance of the HDR 2009 pillars, and contemplates next steps to move their aims forward. It examines some of the global trends that are changing debates on migration and displacement in fundamental ways and will continue to do so—trends such as climate change, the changing nature of work, rising global inequality and the prevalence of mixed movements of migrants and refugees. These trends have profound implications for UNDP and the broader international system. They call for policy innovations and new and collective efforts to address and invest in medium- and long-term solutions to negative drivers of migration. Coalitions of States will need to form to tackle these major challenges.

Specific recommendations for migration policy and programming include new and creative efforts to open legal pathways for migration, including temporary migration for temporary labour needs. Greater participation of migrants and diaspora communities is required to bring experience and insights to the design and implementation of programmes; transformative development benefits; and social safety nets in origin countries to reduce movements driven by necessity rather than choice. The root causes of displacement must be addressed head-on to end protracted displacement. The international community as a whole must cooperate to address the challenges and offer benefits for migrants, refugees, IDPs, host communities, origin and destination countries alike. The menu of necessary change is difficult but urgent.



UNDP Lebanon/Dalia Khamissy

Introduction

“Managing migration is one of the most urgent and profound tests of international cooperation in our time.”

António Guterres, United Nations Secretary-General

A decade ago, the UNDP published the 2009 HDR on human mobility. The report broke new ground in applying a human development approach to the study of migration. It reviewed evidence about who migrants and displaced persons are, where they come from and go to, and why they move. It looked at the multiple impacts of migration for all who are affected by it—not just those who move, but also those who stay. The report highlighted shortcomings in policy responses to migration. Many governments were found to be increasing restrictions on entry, while ignoring health and safety violations by employers of migrants and failing to take a lead in educating the public on the benefits of migration.

By examining policies with a view to expanding people’s freedoms rather than controlling or restricting human movement, the 2009 HDR proposed a bold set of reforms. It argued that, when tailored to

country-specific contexts, these changes can amplify human mobility’s already substantial contributions to human development.

The ascent of migration up the policy agenda, and the greater recognition of the importance of human mobility to human development have been welcome shifts since 2009. There has also been an accumulation of evidence about what works to enhance the gains from migration, and how policies and programmes can shape processes and outcomes to accelerate human development in both destination and origin countries.

The two major Global Compacts adopted in 2018 marked major steps forward: the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration was the first global agreement on a common approach to international migration in all its dimensions, while the Global Compact on Refugees is a framework for more

predictable and equitable sharing of responsibility, as well as greater opportunities for refugees and asylum seekers.

However, major policy challenges persist, and political debates have intensified and grown over time. This can be partly traced to the empirical trends and shifts since 2009: Unprecedented numbers of people are moving across and behind borders. In 2019, about 51 million *more* people were living outside the country where they were born, totalling 272 million. However, the proportion of international migrants in the world population only crept up from 3.2 percent in 2010 to 3.5 percent in 2019.¹ About half of international migrants are women.

The number of refugees is now at a seven-decade peak. The ongoing conflict in Syria has highlighted their plight, and forcibly displaced people are often in the headlines. A decade on, as highlighted in UNDP's recent *Scaling Fences* report, migration has become a defining issue of political contests in countries around the world.

Movements of people across sovereign borders often trigger a deep sense of fear and uncertainty. In many countries, the politics around mobility has become increasingly fraught and often negative. Political campaigns in Europe and the Americas show how opposition to migration has been successfully stoked and used to win elections and referendums. There are also concerns about the exploitation of migrant workers, including low-skilled women working in domestic and other less visible and unregulated spheres.

Globally, public opinion about immigration levels is divided. One survey reports global averages as follows: 34 percent would like to see immigration decreased, 21 percent want it increased, and 22 percent want it kept at its present level.² Yet, given the fundamental links between migration and the development process, as well as demographic and other trends, migration is set to continue to expand in absolute terms as the world's population increases.

This report aims to advance the contributions of UNDP to the international debate and practices on human mobility, while recognizing that other institutions play a vital role in this policy arena.³ It reviews key proposals that emerged from the 2009 HDR and juxtaposes its recommendations against recent trends to advance new and refined thinking on migration and forced displacement.

The chapters are structured as follows. The next chapter focuses on the evolving patterns and politics of human mobility, finding a continuation and some acceleration of trends that were outlined in the 2009 report, as well as the sharp shift in the numbers of people who are forcibly displaced, both within countries and across borders. Chapter 3 reviews the extent to which the six pillars laid out in 2009 have been pursued over the past decade, and what we have learnt about impacts. A broader review of policy trends is in chapter 4, at both the international and national levels. Chapter 5 concludes by looking ahead to the next decade at emerging issues affecting how human mobility can advance sustainable development, and outlining key recommendations.

Although this was not a focus, the report recognizes the new normal created by the novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2). The COVID-19 pandemic contributes

to making human mobility even more complex (See Box 1.1).

BOX 1.1 The COVID-19 pandemic and migration

The COVID-19 pandemic has produced the most comprehensive disruption to human mobility since World War II. While this report is focused on the decade ending in 2019, the scale and impact of the pandemic is impossible to ignore in a report published in 2020. Every kind of mobility—internal and international, temporary and permanent, highly skilled and low-waged, regular and irregular, for every purpose—has been brought to a near standstill by the measures taken to control the virus, and by people’s fears of being exposed to it.


By April 2020, more than 120 countries imposed border closures, and most have not made any exceptions for asylum seekers.⁴ The number of travel restrictions reported by IOM has soared from 2,000 before 11 March, when the World Health Organization declared COVID-19 a pandemic, to more than 60,000 in May.⁵

The economic repercussions of the lockdown are devastating. The International Labour Organization (ILO) has estimated that at the end of April 2020, 68 percent of the world’s workers were living in countries with recommended or required workplace closures, raising the prospect of massive job losses.⁶ Migrant workers are often the first to be fired, and for them job loss often means the loss of legal status and access to services as well as income. Some governments cancelled valid visas and permits. Forcible deportations increase the risk of spreading the virus; in mid-April, a single deportation flight from the United States to Guatemala carried 44 people who tested positive for COVID-19.⁷ In the United Arab Emirates and Singapore, there were reports of migrants being stranded as flights were cancelled, and left to live in dangerously overcrowded conditions with limited, if any, access to health protection or services.⁸ Internal migrants who have lost their jobs may have no choice but to return to their homes and many, as in India, struggle to move.⁹

The Women's Refugee Commission, for example, has heard from partners from Afghanistan to El Salvador to Nigeria, that the loss of income for people on the move and local communities, combined with the shuttering of services as a result of lockdowns, means that food insecurity is an immediate threat to the well-being of displaced women, children and youth.¹⁰

There has been a massive decline in remittance flows, with the World Bank estimating a 20 percent drop in 2020.¹¹ Restrictions on migrant workers also create risks for host communities; several European countries are anticipating crippling labour shortages in the 2020 harvest season. The health sector in many wealthy countries is critically dependent on immigrants; in Switzerland, for example, 42 percent of the doctors are foreign-born.¹²

Several governments have taken steps to mitigate the impact of the pandemic on migrants and the migrant-dependent sectors of their economies.¹³ These include automatic or online extensions of some visa and permit categories to prevent migrants from falling out of legal status, waived fines for visa overstays, easing requirements for changes of status from one immigration category to another, and loosening of restrictions on conditions of work. Australia, for example, waived the requirement for student visa holders to attend classes and removed restrictions on their working hours, to help fill labour shortages in elder-care facilities. Several countries, including Lebanon, have set up call centres for migrants and refugees to provide information on legal and health issues as well as links to sources of assistance. Portugal has granted full citizenship rights, including access to the health care system, for the duration of the COVID-19 crisis to migrants and asylum-seekers. Ireland's Department of Social Protection has made its COVID-19 pandemic unemployment payments available to regular and irregular migrant workers, and testing for the virus is available to all regardless of status. Local governments can play a vital role. New York City, for example, has an extensive migrant outreach program and makes pandemic-related services available regardless of status.¹⁴

It is important during the pandemic to make sure that women have access to livelihood support, emergency assistance (including access to justice) and health services. Migrant women may be doubly disadvantaged because of their legal status and gender discrimination. Domestic workers are particularly at risk; lockdowns mean they are confined to a place of work and a residence that are one and the same. Tensions 

leading to gender-based violence may build, and economically stressed employers may stop paying their wages. Their visas are often tied to their employers. Women migrants may have greater difficulty accessing vital information; they are more likely than men to lack access to information technology, including mobile phones.¹⁵

Access to services is as important for migrants, refugees and internal displaced people as for everyone else, and a key objective of the Global Compacts for Migration and Refugees. But if migrants feel, for example, vulnerable to enforcement actions if they come forward for health services and other social support programmes during the pandemic, they are more likely to hide their symptoms, go to work regardless of illness and avoid seeking treatment. In an infectious disease crisis, “leave no one behind” is not just a noble aspiration in this context, but a vital public health imperative.

It is hard to know, at the time of writing, the lasting impact on human mobility. Some restrictions, particularly within countries, are already being eased, but it is likely that limitations on travel and residence will remain. Movement may become more regionalized, with freedom of movement within regional blocs or travel “bubbles” that permit cross-border movement among a few states—as planned by the Baltic states, as well as Australia and New Zealand.

There is a clear risk that some national leaders will exploit the pandemic to restrict immigration in the longer term. The dire economic consequences of the pandemic may push new waves of irregular migration. At the same time, the pandemic has vividly illustrated the interconnected nature of the world’s economies, societies and communities, and the importance of inclusive policy responses. The future of migration post-pandemic is not foreseeable, but it is more than likely to be different. Irrespective, the principles to follow seem to rest on leaving no one behind, people-centredness, gender sensitivity, human rights, rule of law and due process, whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach, and a focus on sustainable development. While concerted efforts on implementation of the two Global Compacts is a must, the UN Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on IDPs should provide robust recommendations on how best to end protracted displacement, build resilience and durable solutions for the displaced in the new normal defined by COVID-19. ■




UNDP Afghanistan

Patterns and politics of human mobility—an update

This chapter focuses on the evolving patterns and politics around human mobility. On several fronts, we see a continuation and some acceleration of trends that were outlined in the 2009 report, including population aging and the relative attractiveness of very high HDI countries. Elsewhere we see sharp shifts—most notably a significant increase in the numbers of people who are forcibly displaced, both within countries and across borders. The 26 million refugees in 2018 represent an increase approaching 90 percent since 2006, and is now at a seven-decade peak, and the highest level recorded since UNHCR began collecting data in 1951.¹⁶ 2018 saw an increase of almost 1,500 people every day.¹⁷ The United Nations estimates that climate change and environmental degradation could result in anywhere between 25 million and 1 billion displaced people, including migrants, by 2050.

Our overview of what the data reveal about key patterns of mobility, drawing on the most recent data

Figure 2.1: A numerical snapshot of the global population on the move across borders, 2019




Source: HDRO calculations based on UNDESA (2019), ILO (2018) and UNHCR.

and reports available, begins with the broad global and regional picture, then proceeds to highlight women on the move and internal migration, before turning to forced displacement. The chapter concludes with a note on trends in public opinion about international migration and key observations on data gaps. While the depth of empirical analysis undertaken here is far less than what was presented in chapter 3 of the 2009 HDR, the picture provides a good basis to proceed to review the evolution of policy in the chapters that follow.

Patterns

A summary global snapshot of the numbers of people who move across borders, including the forcibly displaced, is shown in Figure 2.1. The figure shows that as of 2019, out of the 271.6 million people living in a country other than where they were born, about 164 million (60 percent) were classed as migrant workers, and 58 percent of those were men.¹⁸ As seen further below, most migrant workers—about 111 million—

Figure 2.2: The number of international migrants has been rising since 2000, while their share remains below 3.5 percent of the global population, 1960–2019




Source: World Bank 2019 for 1960–2010, and UNDESA (2019). Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2019 revision. <http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/>

are employed in high-income countries, where they average about 19 percent of the workforce. By contrast, international migrants average only about 2 percent of the workforce in low-income countries.¹⁹

At the same time, with a world population now exceeding seven billion, only a small minority moves across borders, currently 3.5 percent. The relative stability in the share of people that move stands in contrast to the rapid global integration of knowledge and communications, trade and investment over the same period.

Looking at the current pattern of migration across groups of countries, categorized by the level of human development, the very high HDI group hosts most of the world’s international migrants—almost three fourths of the total—falling to about 13 percent of the total number of migrants for high HDI countries and around 6 percent for medium and low HDI countries. This in turn means that the share of migrants in the national population is around 13 percent in the very high HDI group, but around 1–2 percent in the high, medium and low HDI countries.

Figure 2.3: Share of immigrants in global population by HDI group, 2019



Source: HDRO calculation based on UN DESA (2019). *Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2019 revision*. <http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/>

Note: Throughout this report, unless otherwise stated, human development categories are based on the 2018 Human Development Index: Low (HDI <0.55), Medium (0.55<=HDI<0.7), High (0.7<=HDI<0.8), Very high (HDI>=0.8)

This picture differs from that evident in 1990, when the share of very high HDI countries was about two thirds, rather than three fourths, but is broadly similar to that observed at the time of the 2009 HDR. It reflects the pattern that Michael Clemens and Lant Pritchett investigated for the 2009 HDR, that people seek to move to countries with higher HDI, given the “place premium” associated with residence in higher HDI countries.


Studies show that incomes of migrants are much higher in places of destination than origin, even where migrants occupy low-paid jobs not commensurate with their skills. Recent World Bank estimates (2018) are that migrants’ incomes increase three to six times

when they move from lower to higher-income countries: the average income gain for a young unskilled worker moving to the United States, for example, is estimated to be about US\$14,000 per year.²⁰

The 2009 HDR brought attention to broader gains across non-monetary dimensions of human development. We update the estimates for the potential gains in terms of education and health in figures 2.4 and 2.5 below.

Moving to more developed countries can improve access to health facilities and medical professionals, as well as to health-enhancing factors such as potable water, sanitation, refrigeration, better health information

Figure 2.4: Child mortality at origin versus destination, by HDI category of country of origin, 2015–2019



Sources: HDRO calculations based on UN Inter-agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation (2018). Child mortality estimates. www.childmortality.org and UNDESA (2019). Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2019 revision. <http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/>

Note: Child mortality rate: Probability of dying between birth and exactly age 5, expressed per 1,000 live births. Child mortality at destination is obtained as a weighted average of child mortality rates in destination countries.


and, last but not least, higher incomes. At the same time, migrants, especially those who move on an irregular basis, can face challenges accessing services on the same terms as citizens, as documented in the recent UNDP *Scaling Fences* report—see Box 2.1.

Research commissioned for the 2009 HDR found a 16-fold reduction in child mortality (from 112 to 7 deaths per 1,000 live births) for those who moved from low-HDI countries. While these gains are partly explained by self-selection, the sheer size of the difference suggests that such gains would be difficult to realize at home. Our updated estimates suggest that the size of the difference has shrunk, as child mortality rates have improved in low and middle HDI countries over the

decade. As shown in Figure 2.4, migrants from low HDI countries migrate to countries where child mortality is lower on average by 42 deaths per 1,000 live births. In other words, migrants from low HDI countries migrate to countries where probability of child death is reduced by 55 percent (1–35/77). The largest proportionate gains emerge for emigrants from middle HDI countries—around a four-fold lower rate of child mortality.

Likewise, for education, there are significant potential gains from migration. Many families move with the specific objective of having their children attend better and/or more advanced schools, and many also flee for specific child protection reasons such as child marriage and conflict. Figure 2.5 shows the differences in

Figure 2.5: Expected years of schooling at origin versus destination by HDI category of country of origin, 2015–2019



Sources: HDRO calculations based on UNDP (2019). *Human Development Report 2019. Statistical Annex* and UN DESA (2019). *Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2019 revision*. <http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/>

Notes: Expected years of schooling is defined as the number of years of schooling that a child of school entrance age can expect to receive if prevailing patterns of age-specific enrolment rates persist throughout the child's life.


expected years of schooling for all adults; the gains for women are even larger.

This picture suggests major motivations for people to move to countries with higher levels of human development. To what extent can these motivations be realized in practice? The measure of emigration rates—the proportion of a population that leaves home to live elsewhere—is somewhat different depending on whether we examine average or median rates of emigration. Since the average is skewed by outliers, median rates are more reliable. This shows that emigration rates tend to rise with country HDI levels (Figure 2.6)

The fact that higher levels of human development—measured by the Human Development Index (HDI)—

are associated with higher levels of emigration is contrary to the narrative that development at home will discourage migration. It is however consistent with a key theme of UNDP’s recent *Scaling Fences* report (Box 2.1), and the accumulating evidence²¹ that rising inequalities, access to resources such as money, knowledge and networks, and improved infrastructure and awareness of economic opportunities and lifestyles elsewhere, through social media—along with frustrations at home—tends to give people the means and desire to migrate to urban areas or foreign lands. As long as aspirations rise faster than local opportunities, we can expect emigration to increase even under conditions of rapid development.²² Likewise, those that move tend to be better off, as recent studies of Indonesia²³ and India²⁴ illustrate.

Figure 2.6: Median emigration rate by HD category of country of origin, 2015–2019




Source: HDRO calculation based on UNDESA (2019). Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2019 revision. <http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/>

It is also notable that more than three fourths of emigrants from low HDI countries go to developing

countries—whereas most of the emigrants from high and very high HDI countries go to a developed country.

Figure 2.7: Migrants as a share of total population in selected countries, 1990–2019




Source: HDRO estimates based on UNDESA (2019). *Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2019 revision*. <http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/>

Annex Table 2 shows the estimates for each national HDI level.

Figure 2.7 updates immigrant shares over time for a regionally diverse set of countries that was presented in the 2009 HDR. The picture clearly shows the dominance of “South-South” migration, as the vast majority of immigrants in all the countries come

from developing countries. Most of these countries, have experienced significant rises in the share of immigrants in the population since 1990. Exceptions include Argentina and Kazakhstan. The rising importance of immigration—specially to address labour market needs—can be seen in Kuwait, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia.

Figure 2.8: Where international migrants come from globally, and live



Total number of international migrants: 272 million

○ Indicates where international migrants live ○ Indicates where international migrants come from

The size of the circle is proportional to the number of migrants

Source: HDRO calculations based on UNDESA (2019). *World Population Prospects: The 2019 Revision*. New York. <https://population.un.org/wpp/>

Note: Russian Federation was added to the developing region of Europe and Central Asia; Japan and the Republic of Korea are included in East Asia and Pacific.

Looking across developing regions—the Arab states now host the largest share of the total (15 percent), followed by sub-Saharan Africa (9 percent), with migrants accounting for about 10 and 2 percent of the national population respectively.

Figure 2.8 updates a figure in the 2009 report, mapping where international migrants come from and live across the world, according to regions as defined by UNDP. There are, however, enormous variations

within these regions. The Arab region includes high-emigration countries like Egypt along with high-immigration Gulf States.

Over the past decade, 14 countries—all high-income or upper-middle-income countries—received more than 1 million people. For several of the top receivers, including Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, the large inflows were dominated by refugee movements—a topic investigated below.

BOX 2.1 Scaling Fences: voices of irregular African migrants to Europe

Scaling Fences published by UNDP's Regional Bureau for Africa, reports on the perspectives and experiences of 1,970 individuals originating from 39 countries who migrated through irregular routes from Africa to Europe.

The research shows that those who travelled were relatively better off than their peers, with respondents typically educated above the average levels in their home countries. Income for respondents who were earning at the time of their departure appears to have been competitive in national contexts, with many reporting jobs that were described as safe and regular.

About three out of five perceived that they had been treated unfairly by their governments, often due to ethnicity and political views, and about three fourths felt that their voices were unheard or that their country's political system provided no opportunity through which to influence government.


Source: <https://www.africa.undp.org/content/rba/en/home/library/reports/ScalingFences.html>

Countries with net outflows exceeding 1 million between 2010 and 2020, such as Bangladesh, Nepal and the Philippines, were often characterized by temporary labour movements, a pattern we address in the next chapter. In some other countries, including Syria, Venezuela and Myanmar, insecurity, crisis and conflict have driven large outflows of people over the decade.

Demographic trends

Several major demographic trends with a critical influence on migration via labour market demand and supply that were underway at the time of the 2009 HDR have continued.²⁵ The world’s population is aging, due to increasing life expectancy and women’s falling fertility levels. More countries are experiencing

Figure 2.9: Projections of working-age population by region, 2020–2050



Source: UNDESA (2019). *World Population Prospects: The 2019 Revision*. New York. <https://population.un.org/wpp/>. Accessed 19 June 2019.

Note: Working-age population: Population aged between 15 and 65 years.

shrinking populations, most notably a number of Eastern European nations.

In 2018, for the first time in history, persons aged over 65 outnumbered children under 5 years of age. Indeed, the older age group is growing the fastest and by 2050, in a baseline scenario, one in four persons living in Europe and Northern America could be aged over 65. In a no-migration scenario, the share of elderly relative to working-age people rises to 3 in 10. Figure 2.9 illustrates the projections of working-age population by region through 2020, under a medium variant as well as a no-migration scenario.

The global fertility rate, which fell from 3.2 births per woman in 1990 to 2.5 in 2019, is projected to decline to 2.2 by 2050. Countries with the lowest fertility levels (below 1.2) include Moldova, the Republic of Korea, and Singapore. The fertility rate throughout Europe is low, with no country at replacement rate.²⁶

A shrinking working-age population puts pressure on economies and social protection systems. Migration can offset population decline due to low fertility, as in Belarus, Germany, Italy and the Russian Federation over the decade 2010–2020. However, there are also a number of countries, all in Europe, where low fertility is accompanied by net emigration.²⁷ For example, the net decline in population in Lithuania over the decade was 13 percent.

Since the 2009 HDR, 27 countries have experienced populations shrinking by at least 1 percent due to low levels of fertility, and in some cases high rates of

emigration. The number of countries with shrinking populations is expected to rise to 55 by 2050, and could exceed 10 percent in 26 countries. China's population is projected to decline by 31.4 million, or around 2.2 percent, between 2019 and 2050.

The latest forecasts show that just nine countries will account for more than half the projected total global population growth between now and 2050: India, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Indonesia, Egypt and the USA (in descending order of the expected increase). Around 2027, India is projected to overtake China as the world's most populous country.

Women on the move

Women migrate internationally about as much as men. In fact, the share of female migrants has slightly decreased over the last two decades: in 2019, women and girls represented 47.9% of the international migrant stock compared to 49.3% in 2000 and 48.3% in 2010 (UN DESA, 2019). The perceived “feminization” of migration may be traced to the increased visibility of female migrants, induced by the rising share of women migrating as independent labour migrants and students, rather than as part of family formation or reunification.²⁸

As pointed out in the recent report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, migrant women and girls are a highly heterogeneous group, with different profiles and socio-economic characteristics.²⁹

Migration can increase women's access to education and economic resources, and can improve their autonomy and status.³⁰ Migration may be a way for women and girls to escape restrictive norms at home, as studies of Guatemala and Moldova found.³¹ It may also be a way for more educated women to find jobs and have careers that better use their skills.³² However, among other challenges, migrant women can face difficulties in having their credentials recognized, which leads to “deskilling” as a result of being underemployed.³³

The recent *Scaling Fences* study of irregular migrants found that female respondents did relatively well in Europe, in that the gender wage gap was reversed in Europe, with women earning 11 percent more, as against earning 26 percent less in Africa. Women reported lower levels of deprivation, were more successful in accessing a range of services and were in more settled accommodation than male respondents. More women, including those not earning, were sending money home. The study identified several factors in this relative success, including that they tended to travel to be with family, and that policy environments in Europe were more disposed to provide for female migrants, especially those with children. However, a slightly higher proportion of women reported being affected by crime in the six months prior to being interviewed than men, and significantly more experienced sexual assault. Similar results have been documented by the Center for Global Development³⁴ and studies of immigrant women in the US.³⁵

Some women, however, still face difficulties in leaving their countries because of prohibitive, gender-specific discriminatory laws or restrictive social norms.³⁶

In 2019, according to the World Bank, women in 30 countries did not have the same freedom as men to choose where they wanted to live. Six countries restricted women's ability to travel internationally, while women faced constraints on taking a job in 17 countries. In addition, women in several countries were unable to pass their citizenship to their spouses or children.³⁷ This may lead to child statelessness, with severe long-term effects on children's lives and potential.

Unskilled female migrants tend to work in less regulated and less visible sectors than their male counterparts. For example, most migrant domestic workers are women and adolescent girls. This may increase the risk of exploitation and gender-based violence, including trafficking.

To ensure protection of rights and access to services, firewalls—the strict and real separation between immigration authorities and public services—are crucial, for services such as health, education as well as access to justice. This separation enables migrants to exercise and enjoy their human rights without fear of being reported to the immigration authorities.³⁸

Internal migration

The 2009 HDR underlined the importance of internal migration—both in numerical terms and to human development, even while highlighting measurement challenges.

It remains the case, however, that remarkably little attention is given to the patterns of internal migration around the world. Data are relatively scarce³⁹ and often out of date.⁴⁰ The difficulty of constructing comparable cross-country internal migration data arises because countries have differing numbers and sizes of administrative subregions/localities, which in turn may result in biased estimates of internal migration.⁴¹

The most recent global data published by the United Nations Population Division (2013) draw together the available evidence on internal migration across administrative boundaries for a wide range of countries. According to these estimates, in 2005 there were about 750 million internal migrants in the world, based on lifetime reported migration. This is similar to the magnitude reported in the 2009 HDR—with significant variation across regions and countries. In the Latin America and Caribbean region, internal migration is estimated to be some 50 percent higher than the global measure, while Asia has much lower rates.⁴²

There is some evidence that internal mobility has been declining over time in a number of countries—sometimes attributable to economic events, like the East Asia financial crisis and the Argentinian recession—

and also in developed countries more broadly.⁴³ The most recent figures for the US put internal mobility at historic lows: Fewer than 10 percent of Americans changed residence in 2018–19,⁴⁴ with migration declines for the nation’s young adult population, although the decline can be traced back several decades.⁴⁵ Internal migration in China is also slowing following the large scale movements to urban areas over the past two decades.

A recent volume that brings together data for 66 developed countries for the period 2000–2010 finds divergent trends.⁴⁶ Migration intensities—measured on a comparable basis—appear to be falling in North America and Oceania, in Europe some countries register stability or decline, and rising levels were observed elsewhere. At the same time, the numbers of people internally displaced within their own countries are at record highs, as we now turn to examine.


Forced displacement

Unprecedented numbers of people are now displaced from their homes.⁴⁷ Since the 2009 HDR, the global population of forcibly displaced people—internally displaced as well as refugees crossing borders and asylum seekers—has grown from 43.3 million to 70.8 million, a record high. Total forcible displacement is dominated by the internally displaced—international refugees and asylum seekers account for about 41 percent of the 70.8 million displaced.

The number of refugees—as defined by the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees⁴⁸—is now at a seven-decade peak. The ongoing conflict in Syria has highlighted their plight, and displaced people are often in the headlines.

Most of this increase was between 2012 and 2015, driven mainly by the Syrian conflict, as well as conflicts in Iraq and Yemen, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and South Sudan.⁴⁹ The more recent major outflows include about 750,000 Rohingya

Figure 2.10: Contemporary highlights about forced displacement



Source: UNHCR (2020) *Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2019*.

refugees from Myanmar to Bangladesh at the end of 2017 (where they joined over 200,000 displaced earlier) and the massive outpouring of people from Venezuela, which exceeded 5.2 million by August 2020 (See box 5.2).

The infographic from UNHCR presents contemporary highlights (Figure 2.10).


UNICEF has drawn attention to the 31 million displaced children—of whom over half are internally displaced, with 13 million refugee children and one million child

asylum seekers. The share of refugees has risen recently, but still represents only about one tenth of all international migrants (Figure 2.11).

To put the total numbers in perspective, refugees represent only about 0.3 percent of the world population. This means that all the world’s refugees amount to the total population of a country roughly the size of Romania or the state of New York.⁵⁰

Most refugees continue to reside in countries affected by poverty and crisis, as illustrated in Figure 2.11. Two

Figure 2.11: Refugee numbers have grown recently but remain a small share of total migrants




Sources: Data on refugees: UNHCR (2019). UNHCR database. Data on international migrant stock 1960–1990: World Bank (2019). World Development Indicators Database. Data on international migrant stock 1990–2019: UNDESA. Population Division (2019). International Migrant Stock 2019 (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2019).

thirds of refugees originate from just five countries, while almost two thirds (63 percent) of refugees reside in just 10 countries.⁵¹ Nine of the 10 top host countries are developing countries, and two of those (Sudan and Lebanon) are also conflict-affected states,⁵² as illustrated by Figure 2.12. Unlike other migrants, most refugees—over 80 percent—reside in developing countries. Forcibly displaced women and girls in these settings can face major challenges in

accessing livelihoods and services, as well as insecurity, challenges exacerbated during the COVID-19 crisis.⁵³

While Lebanon has a relatively small population, it hosts the highest number of refugees per capita in the world: for every 1,000 citizens, there are about 156 refugees. By contrast, the U.S. hosts about one refugee per 1,000 citizens.

Figure 2.12: Refugee flows are highly concentrated in several host countries, 2018



Refugee flows from top five origin countries to top 10 host countries

Source: Klugman and Kabir 2019. Data from UNHCR Population Statistics Database. Figure made using RAWGraphs visualization platform.


Public opinion and politics around migration

While almost every empirical study has found that increased mobility leads to large gains for both those who move and for the destination place, the politics around mobility has become increasingly fraught and often negative.⁵⁴ Political campaigns in the US and the

UK, as well as various other places including South Africa have successfully stimulated and used opposition to migration in elections and referendums.

Understanding public attitudes towards refugees and other migrants in their host communities is an increasingly important task, not fully explored in the 2009 HDR. Public narratives on refugees and other

Figure 2.13: Many high-density refugee-hosting countries are fragile states and developing countries, 2018



Sources: Klugman and Kabir 2019. Refugee numbers from UNHCR (2018); host population numbers from the World Bank (2017); fragile and conflict-affected states list from the World Bank and OECD.

migrants are often polarized. Studies have identified a ‘threat narrative’ to national culture, living standards and security, and a ‘positive narrative’ celebrating diversity, and emphasizing the potential benefits of immigration to culture, the economy and society.⁵⁵

Views about immigration do not always fall neatly into left-right demarcations, not least because businesses often lobby for more liberal immigration policies, and trade unions historically have often seen immigration as threatening the wages and interests of their members. Analyses of immigration policy changes for 45 countries over the period 1900–2014 by the Determinants of Migration project at Oxford University did not reveal a clear effect of the ideological position of governments (as measured by party composition) on the extent of restrictiveness.⁵⁶

Globally, public opinion about immigration levels is divided. One survey reports global averages as follows: 34 percent would like to see immigration decreased, 21 percent increased, and 22 percent kept at its present level.⁵⁷ There are large differences in public opinion across regions with more negative views in Europe (about 52 percent saying immigration levels should be decreased), whereas in the United States, about 63 percent support higher immigration levels. A 2016 US poll reported that 58 percent of Americans said having more people of many different races, ethnic groups and nationalities make the US a better place to live, compared with only 23 percent of Europeans.⁵⁸ However some European countries have somewhat more favourable views than the regional average.

These include Sweden (36 percent), the UK (33 percent) and Spain (31 percent).

What drivers influence these attitudes? Factors include perceptions about the size, origin, religion and skill level of immigrants, which often differ from the reality.⁵⁹ The economic and broader conditions in the host country also matter, as well as individual characteristics of survey respondents such as age, education and employment.⁶⁰

The UNDP’s *Scaling Fences* report highlights the value of democratic engagement in shaping policy approaches to migration in host countries. This can ease concerns and anxieties. It noted that overlooked dimensions often include changing labour market needs, the measured effects of different types of migration policies and the historical and contemporary ties that link host and origin countries, and argued for better dissemination of information.

Recent Migration Policy Institute research has examined the ways in which social media and unvetted information sources can polarize opinions, especially when these tap into people’s core identities.⁶¹

Likewise, as Philippe LeGrain argues, facts and rational arguments are often insufficient to sway strongly held opinions; personal stories, social contact, appealing to emotions, emphasizing what unites us, appealing to other people’s values and addressing people’s underlying concerns may be more effective.⁶² This is explored further in Chapter 5.

The evidence seems to point to greater support for immigration and more favourable attitudes toward immigrants in communities where people are more likely to interact with immigrants.⁶³ A recent Overseas Development Institute (ODI) paper⁶⁴ usefully draws together the implications of evidence, emphasizing the importance of engaging effectively with public attitudes towards refugees and other migrants, which requires understanding the real world concerns, emotions

and values around which attitudes are formed. While evidence remains important in influencing policy debates, strategies must acknowledge its limitations as a persuasive tool and rather highlight the manageability of the situation, while emphasizing shared values.

Finding ways to highlight collective benefits for all, including the communities that feel most threatened by immigration, is key.



UNDP/Aude Rossignol

Revisiting the 2009 pillars

The 2009 HDR highlighted six major directions for reform. The report argued that these reforms could be adopted separately but if used together in an integrated approach, they would have complementary and reinforcing effects that would amplify the potential gains for human development. Here we review those pillars, before proceeding to examine the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Global Compacts in the next chapter.

As outlined in the preceding chapter, there have been several major shifts on the migration front since 2009. The sharp rise in forced displacement and increasingly adverse public opinion are perhaps the most significant.

Over the past decade, debates about migration—as on some other major challenges for public policy—have become increasingly polarized. According to some, migration costs jobs and destroys social cohesion. According to others, migration has unequivocally

positive economic benefits. While work that tries to straddle these opposing views remains somewhat rare, it is important to underline that migration is not inherently good or bad; the outcome depends on how migration is managed, and the associated political, social and cultural aspects.

Against the background of international agreements reviewed in the next chapter, governments in Australia, Hungary, Italy, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom and the United States, among others, have nonetheless increasingly sought to restrict immigration. Countries like Australia and the US were traditionally seen as immigrant destinations but the number of immigrants into the United States in 2018 was at its lowest level since the 2008–2009 recession; indeed net immigration of about 200,000 people was 70 percent lower than in 2017, even in the midst of fast economic growth.⁶⁵ The restrictions have significantly tightened during the COVID pandemic.

This chapter reviews the extent to which the six pillars have been pursued over the past decade, and what we have learnt about impacts. A broader review of policy trends follows in the next chapter.

Pillar 1: Legal pathways

The core HDR package proposed two avenues for opening up legal pathways of entry:

- 1 Expanding temporary and circular labour schemes for truly seasonal work in sectors such as agriculture and tourism, through a process involving unions and employers, with the destination and source country governments, to ensure basic wage guarantees, health and safety standards and provisions for repeat visits.
- 2 Increasing the number of visas for low-skilled people, conditional on local demand, but allowing for employer portability—to provide rights to change employers as well as to apply to extend their stay—with pathways to permanent residence, and allowing the transfer of accumulated social security benefits.

At the global and regional levels, the need to expand legal pathways for migration has been asserted both in the Global Compact and the Joint Valletta Action Plan, as explored further in Chapter 4. Here we review the experience of the two avenues proposed in the 2009 report.

Temporary and circular migration

The HDR recommendation on seasonal schemes was part of efforts to facilitate circular migration. Unlike traditional temporary schemes, circular migration enables migrants to cross borders more than once. It is a way to provide flexible labour that adjusts to destination countries' economic needs. Because circular migrants are less likely to try to stay irregularly in destination countries than those coming through (non-circular) temporary programmes, circularity comes with higher levels of acceptance from the native-born population than other forms of migration. Circular migration also aims at improving living conditions of migrants and contributing to the development of origin communities. It offers the guarantee that beneficiaries will be able to migrate several years in a row. Migrants can thus save money without breaking family links. They can also use the money accumulated abroad to invest in productive projects that contribute to local development.

Experience on circularity has accumulated, with evidence of benefits as well as shortcomings. For example:

- The Canadian Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program has been operational for five decades, and brought thousands of workers from the Caribbean, Central America and Mexico, to work on farms: about 50,000 in 2017.⁶⁶ Mexican SAWP workers stayed in Canada for an average of 4.8 months and many returned for additional stints.⁶⁷
- The United Kingdom Seasonal Agricultural Worker Scheme, the longest-running temporary worker

program of its kind in Europe, was shut down in 2013 after nationals of Bulgaria and Romania acquired work rights throughout the European Union.⁶⁸ However this led to worker shortages,⁶⁹ and in 2018 the UK government announced a new pilot offering 2,500 six-month visas to temporary agricultural workers.⁷⁰

- Moroccan agricultural workers, mostly women, come to Spain to pick strawberries and other fruits from April to June each year. Married women with dependent children are preferred as they are considered more likely to return home at the end of their contracts.⁷¹
- About 5,000 Thai farmers travel to Sweden each year to pick wild berries for an average of 70 days. The average participant has repeated the journey seven times, while one has returned 26 times.⁷²
- Australia and New Zealand both have circular migration schemes for workers from Pacific islands employed in agriculture and horticulture.⁷³ As discussed below, they have several of the features that were recommended in the 2009 HDR, including basic wage guarantees, health and safety standards and provisions for repeat visits. However, most of the jobs tended to be taken by men—in the case of New Zealand’s Recognised Seasonal Employer scheme between 2013 and 2017, nine of out ten workers were men.⁷⁴

Participants in many of these programmes have reported incidents of exploitation or abuse.⁷⁵ For seasonal workers—isolated in rural areas, often without local language skills, tied to particular employers—strong oversight and accountability mechanisms are

necessary to protect their rights. Labour unions, NGOs and human rights organizations, along with media exposure of abuses, have sometimes been effective in promoting safeguards. For these and other reasons, not least workers’ long-term structural needs, it has been strongly argued that temporary schemes are not a good substitute for opening up legal channels for workers to immigrate.⁷⁶

Circular migration also occurs outside structured schemes. People who hold dual citizenship or have permanent residence permits can normally move freely, as can citizens in regions that permit free movement—such as the EU and MERCOSUR, or, to a lesser extent, ECOWAS and MERCOSUR—or that have bilateral agreements, such as Australia and New Zealand. However, such mobility is typically not captured in official migration statistics.⁷⁷ Australia and New Zealand are exceptions—they collect administrative data on entries and exits by everyone, thereby making circular migration visible. Studies have found a high degree of circulation of Chinese- and Indian-born Australians between Australia and countries of origin, for example.⁷⁸

Various policy measures—both permissive and restrictive—can affect emigration and circular flows. Recent analysis suggests that visa requirements significantly reduce both inflows and outflows, yielding a “circulation-interrupting effect” estimated to average 75 percent.⁷⁹ This means that migration is much less responsive to economic cycles in visa-constrained corridors. Senegalese migrants in France, Italy and Spain, for example, became less likely to return with the

increasing tightening of entry restrictions, suggesting that the decision to return depends on the prospect of re-migrating again after return.⁸⁰ This situation is more likely to keep families separated, and the impact on children can be severe, depending on care structures and policies.⁸¹

Regional free movement regimes have become more important in shaping migration flows. These allow varying degrees of freedom of movement, visa-free travel or visa reciprocity. The European Union (EU), Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have formed clusters of greater internal openness and, usually, greater external closure.

The European Union has one of the most liberal regimes, although the EU's labour mobility rates are lower than those within the United States.⁸² Estimates from 2018⁸³ suggest that about 17 million people had moved within the EU-28, of whom about two thirds were either working or looking for a job. The flows were quite concentrated. About three quarters of the 17 million migrants went to five countries—France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK. Migrants within the EU traditionally have similar education levels as nationals, but tend to work in low-skilled jobs with labour shortages.⁸⁴ The departure of the United Kingdom from the EU affects approximately 5 million intra-EU migrants, with about 3.8 million EU nationals living in the UK as of December 2018 and 1.2 million UK nationals in other EU member countries.⁸⁵

Since 2009, nine countries—Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay—have implemented the MERCOSUR agreement that gives a two-year residence and work permit.⁸⁶ While rigorous evaluations are not available, a 2014 IOM report estimated that 2 million people acquired this permit.⁸⁷ The MERCOSUR residence arrangements have proved important for the more than 5 million Venezuelans who had to flee their country between 2014 and 2020. Although Venezuela was suspended from MERCOSUR in 2016, the 2002 Residence Agreement allows Venezuelans to work in several countries in the region while also having some access to social services.⁸⁸

In early 2020, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development—comprising Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda—adopted a protocol on free movement, which contains an Article 16 on persons “who are moving in anticipation of, during or in the aftermath of disaster.”⁸⁹

Low-skilled migration

Most low-skilled migrants enter very high HDI countries as family members or refugees, and permanent visas for family reunification can be provided to low-skilled immigrants. While not admitted as labour migrants, they often work in low-skilled jobs and fill essential gaps in the labour market.⁹⁰ Indeed, immigrants fill a quarter of the low-skilled jobs across the European Union and OECD countries, with the proportion rising as high as 40 percent in Germany and 60 percent in Switzerland.⁹¹

The pattern is different in high-income Gulf countries, in that low-skilled migrants are admitted as workers, albeit on temporary work permits.

The data suggest that the overall skill levels of immigrants have generally risen over time.⁹² This reflects rising educational attainment worldwide, as well as increasing demand for skilled labour in middle- and high-income countries alongside a sustained demand for lower-skilled migrant labour, especially in agriculture, construction, catering, and domestic and care work.⁹³ In OECD countries, the share of immigrants who are highly educated has risen by 7 percentage points over the past decade and is higher, at 37 percent, than the proportion of native-born persons.⁹⁴

Highly skilled migrant women tend to have higher rates of migration than low-skilled women, and they are also more likely to migrate than highly skilled men. This creates new opportunities for work and careers, although many highly skilled migrant women are employed in low-skilled jobs, indicating a gap between expectations and opportunities in destination countries. Migrant nurses and doctors can face an extended process to obtain visas and validation of their qualifications, during which time they may need to take up less-skilled work.⁹⁵

So far no schemes appear to have adopted the 2009 HDR recommendation of substantially increasing the number of work visas for low-skilled people, conditional on local demand, and visa portability across employers. The HDR argued that destination countries should

decide on the desired numbers of entrants through political processes that permit public discussion and the balancing of different interests, and that transparent mechanisms to determine the number of entrants should be based on employer demand and economic conditions.⁹⁶

The Canadian Express Entry System introduced in 2015 reflects many of these elements, although the system applies only to highly-skilled immigrants. A digital platform selects from a pool of candidates based on a set of characteristics with weighted points assigned by a government agency based on employer input and the economic and labour market outlook. Canada, Australia and New Zealand have also experimented with ways to attract migrants to less populated and more remote parts of their countries. In Canada, the Provincial Nominee Programmes (PNPs) allow provinces and territories to nominate individuals who are interested in settling in a particular province. Each PNP has at least one immigration stream aligned with the federal Express Entry immigration selection system. These candidates are awarded additional points. According to a recent Migration Policy Institute (MPI) study, the system has kept up with labour market demand and succeeded in de-politicizing the migrant selection process.⁹⁷

A number of countries have hybrid systems in place, allowing both employer demand and individual skills and characteristics to play a role.⁹⁸ These include Australia, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hong Kong, New Zealand, Singapore and the UK.⁹⁹ The points component tends to benefit highly-skilled

BOX 3.1 On regularization of undocumented migrants

Undocumented immigrants live and work in the shadows to avoid deportation. Without formal permission, they often work in the informal sector and concentrated in occupations like construction, agriculture, domestic help, and the service and food industries. For example, two in five formerly undocumented women in the US began their US working lives as domestic servants or child-care workers, and four in five worked in one of only 10 occupations (out of 700 defined specific occupations in the US). Employers may take advantage of workers' lack of legal status by underpaying and not ensuring minimum standards. The workers' job mobility is typically limited to the same occupations.

Many countries have enacted regularization policies that legitimize undocumented residents. The US, most of Europe, Malaysia, and other countries have enacted dozens of such policies over the last 40 years, regularizing millions of residents in the process, and there is pressure for new regularization policies. According to a 2019 Gallup poll, there appears to be broad public support in the US for earned regularization; 81 percent of Americans support the regularization of unauthorized migrants already living in the United States if they meet certain criteria. About 61 percent of Americans oppose deporting all unauthorized immigrants.

While some local groups may oppose regularization for fear of job competition, and it has been argued that the future prospect of regularization may encourage undocumented movement, the evidence suggests that the undocumented are most helped by regularization policies which do not restrict post-regularization mobility and work behaviour.

Regularization's effects depend on the policy's specific provisions. A number of programmes in Europe require a job contract. Spain's 2005 regularization program required proof of one year of employment with a specific employer or a future one-year contract. Italy's 2009 policy (Legge 94), which required employers to submit applications on behalf of workers, effectively prevented workers from leaving an employer, even though the process could take years. While these approaches impede labour mobility, the number of immigrants regularized through the 2005 Spanish law is estimated at 700,000, boosting their employment likelihood by 16 percentage points and their annual earnings by about 12 percent.

Another relevant example is the 2011 UAE reform allowing employer portability, which was found to benefit incumbent migrant earnings, but also lowered the rate of migrant returns. ■

immigrants. Analysing skill-specific migration flows from 185 origin countries into 10 major OECD destinations over the 2000–2012 period, Czaika and Parsons (2017) found strong evidence that points-based systems increase both the volume and the average skill levels of highly-skilled immigration, and discourage or filter out low-skilled workers.¹⁰⁰

A recent major review concluded that “immigration policies have increasingly privileged immigration of the skilled and wealthy as well as citizens of regional blocks, while maintaining (rather than necessarily increasing) high immigration and travel barriers for lower-skilled migrants, asylum seekers and non-regional (‘third country’) citizens.”¹⁰¹

Pillar 2: Ensuring migrants’ rights

The 2009 HDR documented the many ways in which immigrants’ human rights are infringed. Even if most governments have not ratified the international conventions that specifically protect migrant workers, they should ensure that migrants have full rights in the workplace—to equal pay for equal work, decent working conditions and collective organization, for example.

What is the current status? It has been argued that migrant rights are...“codified in a diffuse patchwork of treaty and customary international law, which does not sufficiently establish the rights for individuals crossing borders with clarity—nor is this law consistently respected by states.”¹⁰²

It is useful to distinguish between rights in principle, and rights in practice. The former are grounded in international human rights law, and far more extensive.

It is important to underline that the set of international conventions, declarations and compacts that are relevant to migrants’ rights start with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and apply to all people. The declaration is non-binding, although it is now considered customary international law. Two widely ratified treaties apply as much to migrants as any other persons: the 1966 International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Under the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General Recommendation No. 26 also applies specifically to women migrant workers (2008), while Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 22 (2017) lays out general principles regarding the human rights of children in the context of international migration.

Several treaties to protect migrants have been negotiated, but the number of ratifications is generally low.¹⁰³ The most recent treaty, the 2011 Convention Concerning Decent Work for Domestic Workers, was ratified by 24 States by 2019. The UN Conventions with larger numbers of state ratifications relate to the Status of Refugees and the Protocols on Smuggling and Trafficking attached to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.¹⁰⁴ The 2000 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplements the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, which has been ratified by 19 States

since 2012, while the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness has been ratified by 14 States in the last five years.¹⁰⁵

What happens in practice may not be consistent with international human rights standards and state commitments under relevant conventions. The IOM tracks relevant national laws,¹⁰⁶ but these may not be enforced in practice. Frameworks that establish qualitative and quantitative rights indicators to measure the implementation of migrant rights include the Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD),¹⁰⁷ which develops indicators on migrant rights, especially the rights to non-discrimination, education, health and decent work; OHCHR framework, which sets out general human rights indicators that serve as a model for many other rights indicator frameworks, and the ILO's framework indicators for 'decent work', which may be of use when assessing the migrant workers' rights.

Systematic evidence about the extent to which migrants' rights are being realized or breached in practice is not available, although many human rights organizations expose violations. A new KNOMAD database with 65 binary indicators provides insights about migrants' legal rights for a pilot set of five countries.¹⁰⁸ The data suggest that within this small sample, South Africa had strong protections of rights relating to vulnerable migrants and freedom of thought, opinion, and assembly, for example, while Mexico offers strong protections related to family, education, expulsion, asylum, and non-refoulement. Russia and

Turkey had the least protection of migrant rights overall, while Turkey had the most complete protection of migrant rights to work, and has given refugee legal access to work permits, although in fact very few have been able to attain them. The information in the KNOMAD database is limited to rights on paper, and does not reveal the extent to which protections in law are being implemented in practice. Moreover, high levels of protection for migrant workers (even in practice) are not relevant if most people on the move are not allowed to work.

In countries with strong and independent judiciaries, violations of the human rights of migrants are typically subject to clear legal and institutional constraints,¹⁰⁹ and consular officials can help ensure protection. However, it is often difficult for immigrants to understand and pursue their rights, especially if they lack legal status. Jurisdiction issues may interfere with a migrant's attempts to gain redress. Unauthorized migrants are especially vulnerable if they try to bring an abusive employer to justice. For example, it is very difficult to claim unpaid wages or compensation for workplace injury under threat of deportation, or after deportation.¹¹⁰

Refugee rights come under a legal regime that is more coherent than the patchwork for migrants—although again there are major challenges with respect to implementation, as outlined in Box 3.2. While the details are not examined here, it is also important to make the distinction between refugees and asylum seekers, since in most countries the rights and access to the

BOX 3.2 Refugee rights and protection

The 1951 UN Convention obliges States Parties to refrain from returning refugees under their jurisdiction to countries where their lives or freedom would be threatened. This protection (non-refoulement) is now customary international law and applies to all States worldwide. The Convention and its 1967 Protocol also call on States to accord a broad array of economic and social rights to refugees. These include the right to work, education, housing, public relief and assistance, freedom of religion, court access, freedom of movement, and identity and travel documents. Some rights are to be accorded on terms “as favourable as possible,” recognizing the constraints on host country resources and their primary obligations to their own citizens.

However, many of the rights promoted by the Convention and Protocol are not implemented in practice—as in countries where most refugees are not legally allowed to work, to access public services or to move freely within the host country. Even the cornerstone of non-refoulement is under threat from many refugee-hosting countries.

Restricted access to the labour market is a key barrier facing refugees. A recent study considered the right to work and actual labour market access in 20 major refugee-hosting countries (which together house about 70 percent of the global refugee population), and found that, while refugees in 17 of the countries are eligible to work, in practice labour market access is very restricted. Obstacles include high fees, complex administrative processes or outright obstructions, as well as the lack of social networks. Obtaining legal documentation is reportedly impeded by the high cost. In practice, this means that most refugees find work in the informal economy, as in northern Uganda, for example. The extent of enforcement varies. Informal employment is tolerated for Syrian refugees in Turkey, compared to Jordan, where irregular workers are at risk of being returned to camps.

Sources: Zetter and Ruadei (2016) for the Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD) study; VASyR 2017; VaSyR 2018; Bellamy, Catherine, “The lives and livelihoods of Syrian refugees: A study of refugee perspectives and their institutional environment in Turkey and Jordan.” (ODI), 2017; FAO and OPM. Food Security in Northern Uganda. Asylum Access (2017) Refugee Work Right Report: The Syrian Crisis and Refugee Access to Lawful Work in Greece, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. <https://asylumaccess.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Middle-East-Refugee-Work-Rights-Syrian-Crisis.pdf> ■

labour market are different and more restrictive for asylum seekers, estimated to number about 3.5 million globally in 2018.¹¹¹

Important rights include the right to join a trade union or other organizations (free association), as well as the right to practice one's own religion. There have been concerns about rising Islamophobia in Europe.¹¹²

As at the time of the 2009 HDR, it remains clear that higher admissions and greater protection of migrants' rights do not go hand in hand. The Gulf countries, for example, admit large numbers of labour migrants but severely curtail their post-entry rights.¹¹³ While illegal, it is reportedly common for migrants to have their travel documents taken by employers.¹¹⁴ The employer sponsorship (kafala) system ties the migrant to a particular employer, with immediate deportation if the relationship ends. This system forces those migrants who find themselves in abusive situations to choose between their rights and their livelihoods. Women migrants, who are mostly employed in households, are especially vulnerable. No Gulf country allowed employer portability until the United Arab Emirates in 2011. Now the UAE is considering abolishing the kafala system altogether.

Migrants' access to services and social protection is limited in many countries, sometimes legally and often practically. A recent ILO mapping of bilateral and multilateral agreements across 120 countries found limited coverage, and pointed to the need to

examine national laws and frameworks around social protection.¹¹⁵ Even in the absence of such agreements, destination countries can and should unilaterally adopt provisions to assure access to health care and social security. The WHO'S 2019–2023 Global Action Plan on promoting the health of refugees and migrants recommends that they should be included in universal coverage and that access to reproductive health programmes for women and girls be protected. The importance of continuity of care for refugees and other migrants, not just short-term or emergency care, was underlined.¹¹⁶

Unauthorized migrants often pay into social security systems but cannot access the associated benefits. It is estimated that fewer than a quarter of international migrants are covered by a Bilateral Social Security Agreements (BSSA) which equalize the retirement benefits of migrants whose working life has been spent in two countries.¹¹⁷ Examples of existing BSSAs include those in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Morocco and Turkey. World Bank assessments found that these agreements are fair to the workers in terms of access to pensions and health care, although there are some bureaucratic and information problems.¹¹⁸ For example, Morocco and Turkey use a paper-based system rather than the EU destination countries' digital systems. In the case of Australia's seasonal worker scheme, workers pay into retirement schemes, but few have access to the money once they return home.¹¹⁹ The same is true for many migrants who pay into the US Social Security system for less than 10 years.


Pillar 3: Lowering transaction costs

The 2009 HDR noted that the transaction costs of acquiring the necessary papers and meeting administrative requirements to cross national borders are often high, regressive (proportionately higher for unskilled people and those on short-term contracts) and can also have the unintended effect of encouraging irregular movements and smuggling. At that time, one in 10 countries had passport costs that exceeded 10 percent of per capita income; not surprisingly, these costs are negatively correlated with emigration rates. Both origin and destination governments can

simplify procedures and reduce document costs, and work together to improve and regulate intermediation services.

The repercussions of high formal costs and restricted official movement can include increasingly dangerous routes to reach the desired destinations. The IOM’s Missing Migrants Project tracks incidents involving migrants, including refugees and asylum-seekers, who have died or gone missing in the process of migration, regardless of their legal status. The project records only those migrants who die during their journey to a country different from their country of residence.

Figure 3.1: Recorded migrant deaths by region, 2014–2019



Source: Missing Migrants (2020), Recorded migrant deaths by region of origin, 2014–2019. <https://missingmigrants.iom.int/>. Accessed on April 30 2020.

Figure 3.1 shows that the annual number of fatalities recorded peaked in 2016, at more than 8,000, with the caveat that these estimates should be taken as minima. UNICEF and IOM estimate that nearly 1,600 children have been reported dead or missing since 2014, although many more go unrecorded.¹²⁰


Access to legal identity has come to the fore of the global agenda since 2009. Legal identity for all, including birth registration, is part of the SDGs, and is seen as increasingly critical to the principle of leaving no one behind. SDG 16.9 aims to grant all persons a legal identity by 2030. A legal identity document (ID)

affects access to rights to property, business, housing, employment, financial inclusion and social services, and even a mobile phone. These are all essential to establishing oneself in a new location. Without an official ID, it is almost impossible to gain legal authorization to migrate internationally.

Recent data showing the coverage of identification for 99 countries for the first time¹²¹ estimate that a billion people face challenges in proving who they are. In low-income countries, on average, over 45 percent of women lack an ID, compared to 30 percent of men. Gender differences are much greater in a number of

Figure 3.2: Top 10 countries with the greatest gender gaps in ID coverage

Gaps in ID coverage by country, 2018



Source: Insights from new ID4D-Findex survey data. id4d.worldbank.org

countries, as shown in Figure 3.1. There is also a clear association between poverty and lack of provable identity—across the 18 low-income countries surveyed, 45 percent of the poorest quintile lack an ID, compared to 28 percent of the top. This may be partly due to the costs of obtaining an ID, including travel costs and supporting documentation. Poor people and women are thus more likely to face this barrier to migration.

The best-known aspect of transaction costs are remittance costs, the costs involved in sending and receiving money. A commitment to reduce such costs was agreed in SDG 10.7, which commits to reducing average sending costs to 3 percent of the amount remitted, and to eliminate costs higher than 5 percent from all corridors.

In 2019, remittances to low and middle-income countries hit a record high of \$554 billion, almost 5 percent higher than in 2018.¹²² However, the global economic recession induced by the COVID-19 pandemic should translate into a significant decline in remittances to developing countries. The World Bank foresees a global drop in remittances by about 19.7 percent in low and middle-income countries in 2020.¹²³ This will significantly affect recipients and their communities, especially when sending remittances remains expensive. The most recent data suggest that the costs of sending U\$200 to low- and middle-income countries averaged about 7 percent,¹²⁴ more than double the SDG target. Costs exceeded 10 percent in many migration corridors to Africa and small islands in the Pacific. This is attributed to high informal flows, lack of competition, and the use of mobile and other new

technologies lagging behind. At 5 percent, the average costs of sending remittances to South Asia were the lowest regional average, while costs of sending from Russia are the lowest in the world, around 2 percent for a \$200 transfer.

The World Bank, as in a recent report,¹²⁵ offers several recommendations to reduce remittance costs. They include greater competition among remittance service providers, greater harmonization of regulatory requirements and assistance to government financial authorities to comply with stringent anti-money laundering and terrorist financing regulations. The risks to banks and money-transfer operators in failing to comply with such regulations are so high that many have cut off their relations with smaller and less formal remittance transfer organizations, thereby raising costs to migrants.

Migrants also face high costs relating to recruitment, travel and financing for the expenses of migration. Most lower-skilled guest workers find jobs with the help of for-profit recruiters who often charge workers for job-matching services.¹²⁶ Recruitment agents perform a valuable service in matching workers with employers in a complex global labour market, and negotiating the cumbersome bureaucratic requirements for legal migration. But many charge excessive fees for their services, effectively appropriating a large share of the gains of migration. Seasonal berry-pickers in Sweden, for example, pay as much as two thirds of their season's earnings as fees to recruitment agencies covering their visas, travel, placement, housing and local transport.¹²⁷ Philip Martin highlights as typical the case

of a Bangladeshi migrant worker who reported paying \$2,000 to a recruiter for a contract job in Saudi Arabia paying \$200 a month or \$7,200 for the three-year term of the contract, amounting to more than a quarter of the worker's earnings abroad.

The ILO has raised concerns about private recruiters, with the 2014 annual conference noting:

*substantial evidence of widespread abuse connected with the operation of these [recruitment] agencies... (ranging) from excessive rates and sometimes extortionate fees, to deliberate misinformation and deception concerning the nature and pay and conditions of work that is on offer. Migrants will often have little or no means of redress in the face of unscrupulous intermediaries once they get to their destinations and problems become apparent. This type of situation can give rise to extremes of exploitation, as in cases where workers acquire very high levels of debt to pay recruitment fees.*¹²⁸

ILO conventions recommend that employers pay all costs for the migrant workers they hire, as does the US for its H-2A and H-2B programmes. Some schemes specify the shares of migration costs that employers and migrants must pay, as does Canada with its Seasonal Agricultural Worker Programmes with Caribbean countries and Australia and New Zealand with their Pacific Island seasonal worker programmes. Some major countries of origin set maximum worker-paid migration costs before departure; for example, the Philippines sets the maximum at one month's foreign earnings or 4.2 percent of foreign

earnings for a two-year contract and 2.8 percent for a three-year contract. A 2014 reform of the Mexican Federal Labour Law requires recruitment agencies to register with the Secretary of Labour and Social Welfare, and bans false or misleading statements by recruitment agents. Recruiters are not permitted to charge migrants for their services, whether directly or through arrangements with employers to make deductions from workers' pay, and cannot discriminate against, or blacklist, workers for any reason, including advocating for their own or others' rights.¹²⁹

In practice, however, workers often end up paying more than the law permits, because of inadequate enforcement, the ease with which recruiters who are sanctioned can re-establish themselves under another name, and the desire of some workers to get jobs abroad who therefore agree to pay additional fees.¹³⁰

Pillar 4: Win-win for countries of destination and migrants

The HDR argued, "It is vital to ensure that individual migrants settle in well on arrival, but it is also vital that the communities they join should not feel unfairly burdened by the additional demands they place on key services. Where this poses challenges to local authorities, additional fiscal transfers may be needed. Language training is key—for children at schools, but also for adults, both through the workplace and through special efforts to reach women who do not work outside the home. Some situations will need more active efforts than others to combat discrimination,

address social tensions and, where relevant, prevent outbreaks of violence against immigrants. Civil society and governments have a wide range of positive experience in tackling discrimination through, for example, awareness-raising campaigns.”

Public debate over immigration has intensified over the decade since the 2009 HDR amidst unprecedented numbers of refugees globally and a wave of nationalist electoral victories where anti-immigrant campaigns came to the fore, for example in Brazil, Hungary and the US.

The evidence about the impacts of migration on countries of destination and on migrants themselves is updated here, and the evidence of impacts on labour markets (labour force participation, employment and wages), fiscal effects and broader implications for competitiveness and the economy, including economic institutions, is reviewed.¹³¹ The impact and effects of public opinion about immigration is addressed in Chapter 3.

Overall, as outlined by Clemens *et al.* in 2018, “Whether the host country is developed or developing, the potential benefits of hosting migrants and refugees include (but are not limited to) higher incomes and employment rates for natives, net positive fiscal effects; increased innovation and more efficient, productive economies... (However) with the wrong policies in place, these benefits may be lost and some of the fears that many have about immigration may be borne out.”

As was the case at the time of the 2009 HDR, a recent major study concluded, “The vast majority of research finds that the average labour market effect of immigration and refugee inflows to both developed and developing countries is small or null. However, it is true that immigration often has more adverse impacts (though still relatively small) on certain groups in the native population—particularly those that are most similar to the immigrants in terms of education and abilities.”¹³²

A recent OECD/ILO study of 10 developing countries¹³³—Argentina, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, the Dominican Republic, Ghana, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, Rwanda, South Africa and Thailand—using both quantitative and qualitative methods, provides evidence on the impact of labour immigration on the economies of host countries. It examined three main dimensions: labour markets, economic growth and public finance. The results largely confirm the findings of earlier literature, specifically:

- Immigrants in most destination countries have higher labour force participation and employment rates than native-born workers. The analysis shows that the overall impact of immigration on labour market outcomes of native-born workers, especially wages, is negligible, although the results are diverse and highly contextual. This is in line with the majority of research on OECD countries, which finds only a small effect.
- The estimated contribution of immigrants to gross domestic product (GDP) averaged 7 percent, ranging from about 1 percent in Ghana to 19 percent in Côte d’Ivoire.

- Immigrants' net fiscal contribution was found to be generally positive but limited, in line with the available evidence for OECD countries.

Many economic studies examine employment and wage effects on both local and immigrant workers and find divergent results. This is partly due to the empirical challenges involved in estimating the size of effects.¹³⁴ For example, immigrants may not find jobs commensurate with their education levels—immigrants' overrepresentation at the bottom of the wage distribution appears to reflect skill downgrading, although there is also evidence of upgrading of immigrants over time, as found in a major recent study of Germany, the UK and US.¹³⁵ One National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) study found that low-skilled refugees arriving in Denmark between 1986 and 1998 had a positive effect on the low-skilled native workforce, with training and other support leading the latter to take on more skilled jobs.¹³⁶

Companies can benefit from refugee recruitment, partly because refugees tend to have a lower turnover rate than other employees.¹³⁷ A recent study tracing the impact of the large number of Syrian refugees on the labour market outcomes of locals in Turkey¹³⁸ found that immigration has reduced informal employment by about 2 percent for locals, although the impact on wage outcomes was negligible and there was an increase in formal employment for men. Overall, the impact of massive Syrian refugee inflows on the Turkish labour markets was limited. Studies also suggest that the ability of refugees in Turkey to formally own businesses has led to the creation of almost

6,000 small and medium enterprises over the period 2011–2016, on average employing more than nine people, with intentions to grow. Most of the nearly 57,000 jobs created were held by Turkish citizens due to legal requirements.¹³⁹ In provinces with large refugee populations, businesses in the host regions increased gross profits and net sales. There has been a large increase in the number of foreign-owned firms and no indication that domestic firms have been displaced.¹⁴⁰

There is substantial evidence that migrants have a positive effect on both businesses and the wider economy—the IMF estimates that a 1 percent increase in the migrant share of the population in high-income countries boosts per capita income by 2 percent.¹⁴¹

In most countries, immigrants are more likely to be self-employed than locals with similar education levels. It is notable that in the US, immigrants are nearly twice as likely as American-born citizens to start businesses,¹⁴² and 51 percent of all US start-up companies valued at \$1 billion—the so-called unicorns—have at least one immigrant founder.¹⁴³ A significant number of high-tech companies (36 percent), including Google, eBay, Instagram and Intel, were founded by immigrant entrepreneurs. While the “hard-working immigrant” is most commonly assumed to be male, in fact 40 percent of immigrant entrepreneurs in America are women, according to the National Women's Business Council (NWBC)—women like Neha Narkhede, the cofounder and chief technology officer of a streaming data technology company currently valued at \$2.5 billion.¹⁴⁴

Evidence suggests that the fiscal impact of new immigrants varies significantly across contexts, and depends on the policies in place. In particular, policies that encourage high rates of refugee employment can translate into net positive fiscal contributions from refugees. When immigrants are employed, they are less in need of welfare services and will also contribute more by paying income and consumption taxes. If immigrants become business owners, they can contribute to revenues by paying business tax, importing goods on which there are tariffs, or by employing others, who will in turn pay more in taxes.

This underlines the importance of policies and rules that enable migrants and refugees to legally work. Recent analysis conducted by the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security (GIWPS) in collaboration with the International Rescue Committee (IRC)¹⁴⁵ explored the costs associated with the double disadvantage facing refugee women because of their refugee status and gender gaps. Across several top receiving refugee destination countries for which data are available, the report found that refugee women's employment rates varied from about 40 percent in the US and Uganda (37 percent) to as low as 6 percent in Germany, Jordan and Lebanon. The dual disadvantage was clearest in Turkey, where the pay gap between refugee women and native-born men was roughly 94 cents per dollar. It was estimated that refugee women could contribute up to an additional \$1.4 trillion to annual global GDP if employment and earnings gender gaps were closed to meet the national levels of hosting countries, based on analysis done in top

30 refugee hosting countries, which host 90 percent of the world's refugees.

Labour market integration poses challenges in many countries. In 2015–2016, Sweden accepted the highest number of refugees per capita in Europe, and has a range of supportive policies—for example the recognition of credentials¹⁴⁶ and free language classes. However, refugee employment rates are lower than for similarly qualified locals. Part of the challenge may be a system of social assistance that creates high marginal tax rates for those transitioning to work.¹⁴⁷

An important gender dimension that has emerged from the evidence is that low-skilled immigration—especially of women—can enable local women, especially the highly skilled, to participate in paid work. This has been called the “care chain”. In the US, for example, increasing the supply of affordable domestic workers allowed more women with young children to stay in the workforce and work longer hours.¹⁴⁸ In Malaysia, one study found that having a maid caused a woman to be 18 percentage points more likely to participate in the labour force.¹⁴⁹

George Borjas and Paul Collier have suggested that large inflows of migrants and refugees can undermine the destination country's institutions because they are likely to import institutional dysfunction from their origin countries.¹⁵⁰ However, there is little empirical evidence to support this view. Research examining how immigration affects economic institutions in destination countries has found either positive or no

real-world impacts,¹⁵¹ for example in terms of economic freedom scores.¹⁵² A review of the natural experiment found that Israel's acceptance of a massive number of Jewish refugees from the Soviet Union substantially improved its economic institutions.¹⁵³ A recent study using the Synthetic Control Method estimates the effect on Jordanian economic institutions from the surge of refugees from the First Gulf War, equal to 10 percent of Jordan's population. Refugees had a large and direct impact because they could work, live and vote immediately upon entry. The refugee surge was the main mechanism by which Jordan's economic institutions significantly improved in the following decades.¹⁵⁴

Pillar 5: Improving internal mobility

At the time of the 2009 HDR, it was estimated that up to around a third of governments maintained *de facto* barriers to internal movement within their own countries, typically in the form of reduced basic service provisions and entitlements for those not registered in the local area.

Ensuring equity of basic service provision for internal migrants was one of the report's key recommendations. Equal treatment is important for temporary and seasonal workers and their families, for the regions where they go to work, and also to ensure decent service provision back home so that they are not compelled to move in order to access schools and health care.

Today, very few countries, namely China, Cuba and North Korea, restrict internal movement of citizens.¹⁵⁵ The world's largest country, China, maintains restrictions on moving one's place of residence that affect about 290 million internal migrants.¹⁵⁶

Efforts to restrain the growth of megacities such as Beijing and Shanghai have given rise to restrictions on those who are not formally registered in the place where they live, who are denied basic rights such as sending their children to local schools or gaining access to public services. However, reforms of the residency (*hukou*) system are giving more rights to internal migrants in smaller cities while maintaining strict controls over access to education, formal work and housing in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou.¹⁵⁷ At the same time the government restricts the freedom of both internal and external movement of certain ethnic minorities, particularly Tibetans and Uighurs, and of political dissidents.

Even without formal constraints, mobility can still be challenging. A recent KNOMAD review usefully highlights the drivers and constraints to internal mobility, pointing to financial constraints, distance and incomplete information, which can be mitigated by social networks.¹⁵⁸

Most development policies will affect internal mobility in some way, by affecting the relative attractiveness of different places and access to and returns associated with different opportunities. It is obviously beyond the scope of this paper to review all such policy

actions. Here we highlight two important factors: public provision of transport and communication. Where road networks are poor and travel is costly, particularly relative to rural household income, this may limit movement, as in Ethiopia.¹⁵⁹ Recent studies also highlight the potential importance of credit constraints, in Bangladesh¹⁶⁰ and China.¹⁶¹ On the other hand, increasing access to mobile phones can help overcome information barriers, as well as enable remittances—M-Pesa in Kenya being a notable example of an efficient mobile transfer service.¹⁶²

Pillar 6: Mainstreaming migration into national development strategies

The 2009 HDR argued that migration can be a vital strategy for households and families seeking to diversify and improve their livelihoods, and that governments need to recognize this potential and integrate migration with other aspects of national development policy.

Evidence continues to show the importance of structural migration determinants in shaping long-term migration processes. These include the level and quality of economic opportunities, labour market structure, access to education, social safety nets, safety and security and environmental factors. The nature of opportunities in countries of origin interact with real or perceived differences in opportunities—for work, education, physical safety and freedom from social or political repression—in destination countries. In this important sense, the inequality of opportunities within

and across countries plays a central role. Policies and programmes that deliberately seek to promote, limit and/or shape migration operate alongside these other determinants of migration, which may well be more powerful in practice. As the recent UNDP report on irregular migration into Europe, *Scaling Fences*, concluded: “The notion that migration can be prevented or significantly reduced through programmatic and policy responses designed to stop it is thrown into question”.

In the decade since HDR 2009 was published, more governments in origin countries have explicitly recognized the development potential of migration. Much attention is now given to the volume of remittance flows across borders. Remittances have exceeded official aid—by a factor of three—since the mid-1990s and in 2019 were reportedly on track to overtake foreign direct investment flows to low- and middle-income countries. The World Bank tracks and regularly publishes data on remittance flows—the latest estimate is that flows to low- and middle-income countries reached \$551 billion in 2019, up by 4.7 percent from 2018.¹⁶³ As a share of GDP, the top five countries receiving remittances are Tonga, Haiti, Nepal, Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic. In absolute terms, the top receivers were India, China, Mexico, the Philippines and Egypt. The rate of growth of remittances is variable over time, depending on the rate of economic growth and exchange rates, among other factors.¹⁶⁴

Some governments have taken actions to mobilize their diaspora to become partners in development,

and have sought to provide opportunities for more productive uses of remittances. Diasporas are sources of remittances but also, and perhaps more importantly in the long run, of foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, market development, technology transfer, tourism development and philanthropy as well as more intangible flows of knowledge and new ways of doing things. Scores of developing countries have established departments, bureaux or entire ministries to promote and facilitate diaspora engagement in their home countries. Activities include the establishment of Diaspora Trade Councils and participation in trade missions and business networks. For example, African embassies in London and Washington, DC have supported business and trade forums to attract diaspora investors and to try to match suppliers with exporters.¹⁶⁵ While there are some case studies, rigorous evidence on the extent to which these initiatives are successful is not available.

The connections between several dimensions of migration (emigration, remittances, return and immigration) and sectoral policies, such as labour market, agriculture, education and social protection, were explored in a recent OECD volume, *Interrelations between Public Policies, Migration and Development*, which is based on quantitative and qualitative surveys in 10 developing countries.¹⁶⁶ Key findings include:

- Policies to promote vocational skills, for example, or more effective social protection programmes, may make it easier for people to move—even if their new circumstances are more difficult than the lives they left behind. Among graduates of vocational

training, the intention to emigrate rose in eight of the 10 countries.

- Policies and programmes that relieve household financial constraints tend to facilitate emigration.
- Support for children’s education (cash transfers) discouraged emigration only when parents needed to stay home to fulfil the conditions associated with the transfers.
- On the other hand, well-developed social protection and pension systems at home could encourage people to return to their countries of origin.

There is some evidence that better institutions and less corruption tends to reduce emigration,¹⁶⁷ although the record of development assistance on this front is mixed.

The overall picture that emerges is that the impacts on emigration depend very much on the structure of labour demand and supply at home and abroad, as well as the institutions, policies and programmes in place.¹⁶⁸ As underlined by Michael Clemens and others, more successful development efforts at home do not necessarily reduce migration. It is often misleading, therefore, to think of under-development as a “root cause” of migration—since more successful development efforts may accelerate emigration.

Some development partners have also begun to give more attention to programmes to enhance the development benefits from movements of people. More broadly, “mainstreaming migration into development planning” has become an accepted mantra of good practice for national authorities and development

practitioners. The OECD study mentioned above underlines the importance of allowing immigrants' access to labour markets and public services, so they can contribute to the economy and society, highlighting the examples of Costa Rica and Cote d'Ivoire. The recommendations are generally consistent with accepted good practices in development more broadly, such as improving the investment climate to support job creation, and supporting women's access to financial and agricultural markets, to enable greater economic independence.¹⁶⁹

A recent IOM/UNDP study of the State of Play on Mainstreaming Migration into Policy Planning¹⁷⁰ examined the experience of 11 developing countries¹⁷¹ and found that, as of December 2017, they had made good progress in terms of stated plans and policies, with increasing engagement of the private sector, civil society and diaspora and migrant communities. However, few countries had developed a plan of action for the policies where migration has been mainstreamed or for specific migration and development policies. And, more generally and perhaps most striking, no countries under review have yet reached the point of implementing any such plans in relation to migration.

The evidence suggests that mainstreaming migration into laws and policies takes time, and can be constrained by short programming schedules, staff turnover, lack of capacities and understanding or human and financial resources. Types of coordination mechanisms varied from working groups to technical committees to inter-ministerial councils. Good

strategic and technical coordination mechanisms worked well. For example, to build ownership and inter-ministerial coordination, the Philippines has legally mandated committees to coordinate on migration and development.

The IOM/UNDP study offers useful country-level snapshots of the state of planning on migration and development. For example, Ecuador's National Development Plan 2017–2021 includes managing human mobility as a government priority for the national government. The new Law on Human Mobility enshrines a human-rights based approach to development and migration governance that does not distinguish between rights based on migratory status. In mid-2017 the government established a National Council for Equality of Human Mobility to monitor the mainstreaming of migration policies, including equal representation of the state and civil society.

Jamaica is notable for its efforts to facilitate migration policy coherence and effective governance through a structure of working groups established in 2011, and the 2017 National Policy on International Migration and Development. The study notes, "The set up in Jamaica is institutionally sound but needs now to move beyond policy formulation and make strategic strides and to implement prioritized policy actions at both the national and local levels... immediate steps are needed to... adequately address migration related issues and work with citizens and migrants to ensure that migration contributes to the country's national development goals and enhance overall wellbeing."

BOX 3.3

How migration is being considered in development planning processes

UNDP and IOM have supported the Government of Jamaica in mainstreaming migration into development plans. In 2017, Jamaica developed the first National Policy on International Migration and Development in the English-speaking Caribbean, which seeks to ensure inter-institutional coherence among policy areas and interventions to maximize the benefits of migration, improve the government's capacity to monitor and manage international migration in line with Jamaica's socio-economic development objectives.

The UN Joint Migration and Development Initiative (JMDI), a joint programme of UNDP, IOM, ILO, UNHCR, UNFPA and UN Women, supported the Municipality of Naga City in the Philippines to mainstream migration into local development planning.

Bangladesh's National Urban Poverty Reduction Programme, a joint collaboration with DFID and UNDP, supports the government to address the challenges of rapid urbanization as a result of rural to urban migration. This programme also works to build resilience by improving the integration of poor communities, including migrants from rural areas, into municipal planning, budgeting, management and delivery, with a focus on women and girls and their climate resilience.

UNDP Moldova is supporting the government to implement a project aiming to link migrants with their home localities, piloted in 38 communities. Activities include the designation of migration focal points, launching and updating local migration databases and consultations with migrants. Hometown Associations have been established as an institutional mechanism for migrants' engagement in local planning and development. Over 200 small and medium initiatives were jointly implemented by migrants and local authorities in education, culture, health, and social care within two years. An estimated 9,000 migrants have contributed over \$3.5 million to improve local services in their home villages.

Source: Final Report: Joint IOM/UNDP Global Project on Mainstreaming Migration into National Development Strategies (2014–2018). Funded by Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation.

Box 3.3 highlights recent examples of how migration is considered in development planning processes, supported by UNDP and other agencies. While impact evaluations are not available, the diversity of settings shows the ways migration is being considered in planning processes.

Nonetheless, migration generally remains marginalized in development programmes. Projects that directly link migration to development remain somewhat rare. The seasonal worker schemes in the Pacific that have emerged over the past decade are exceptions. These schemes have succeeded in promoting origin-country development objectives to promote income growth, while filling labour market needs in the destination countries (Box 3.4).

Global skills partnerships are another approach designed to offer benefits to both origin and destination countries. The current destination countries are Belgium and Germany, as well as Australia and New Zealand.¹⁷² The Australia-Pacific Technical College, for example, provides vocational education in occupations such as nursing or auto repair that are in high demand in both labour markets, but very few (less than 3 percent) of the thousands of graduates have actually migrated to Australia and New Zealand, mostly because of barriers in the points-based visa systems. The Porsche automobile company has had better outcomes with the mobility of graduates from their training centre in the Philippines, with some going to work at service centres in the Gulf or Europe while others find work in the Philippines.

Concerns have been raised about the skills partnership model—including by Philip Martin who notes the risk that students could incur major costs without the assurance of gaining well-paid work abroad,¹⁷³ and the disadvantages of seasonal worker schemes could be replicated.

Finally, attention is drawn to the way that official development assistance (ODA) has been recently deployed in attempts to directly limit the movement of people. The US suspended ODA in an attempt to restrict border crossings from Central America, which was recently restored after each of the countries reached at least partial agreements with the US that would reportedly help implement a new rule denying asylum to migrants and return them to Central America.¹⁷⁴ In 2016, the European Union's Migration Partnership Framework was established to “sustainably manage migration flows”, although its strong focus on European interests marked a departure from previous EU migration initiatives and generated some controversy. A 2017 review found that in the five priority countries—Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal—the concrete achievements of the migration partnerships have been limited, and that the migration programming, with its focus on tightening borders and preventing people from moving, suffered from serious flaws.¹⁷⁵

Finally, but not least, it is important to note that a significant portion of development assistance has been diverted to deal with new arrivals in developed countries. While humanitarian assistance is traditionally

counted as part of ODA, in 2016 donor countries spent some \$15.4 billion on hosting forced migrants domestically. This amounts to over 10 percent of all official foreign assistance.¹⁷⁶ Some donors take this out of their aid budgets, which may effectively cut the resources allocated to programmes in developing countries.¹⁷⁷ This is in addition to support for humanitarian assistance, and the \$25 billion spent by OECD DAC countries on forced migration issues, or approximately 17.5 percent of all global ODA. The volume of resources directed to addressing forced

displacement, in both developing and developed countries, underlines the need to consider ways to align these policies and programmes with development priorities.

The pillars of HDR 2009 retain their relevance in 2019, but new issues and patterns have changed the migration landscape globally, and the policy agenda has evolved accordingly. We now turn to examine the broader policy framework.

BOX 3.4 Seasonal worker and labour schemes in the Pacific

Since its launch just before the 2009 HDR, New Zealand's Recognized Seasonal Employer Scheme (RSE) has been regarded as a model of good practice. The policy allows the horticulture and viticulture industries to recruit workers from overseas for seasonal work when there are not enough New Zealand workers. People employed under the RSE policy may stay in New Zealand for up to seven months during any 11-month period (except workers from Tuvalu and Kiribati, who can stay for nine months because of the distance and the cost of travel). Admissions were capped at 14,400 in October 2019—although the sending countries Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu all have small populations.

A multi-year prospective evaluation measuring the impact of participating on households in Tonga and Vanuatu found positive development impacts in terms of income, consumption, and savings of households, durable goods ownership, and subjective standard of living. The results also suggest that child schooling improved in Tonga. The programme's design has been successful at preventing

worker overstay, which was below 1 percent in the first six years of the programme (FY 2007–2013). Workers' ability to return to New Zealand through the RSE discourages overstay, as does employer support for return travel expenses and employer penalties for overstays.

Australia's Seasonal Worker Programme, which allows uncapped numbers of workers from the Pacific and Timor-Leste to work on Australian farms for up to nine months, now receives upwards of 12,000 participants (growing by some 44 percent or 3,000 workers in 2018–2019), and evaluations have found large income gains for participants. In Tonga the money earned is double the amount of bilateral aid. While slow to find its feet compared to the RSE, the SWP surpassed Pacific RSE participation in 2018–2019. However, relatively few (less than one in five) participants are women.

A new Pacific Labour Scheme provides workers from nine Pacific island countries and Timor-Leste opportunities for employment in low and semi-skilled occupations in rural and regional Australia for up to three years, and the numbers are now uncapped. While the new programme has only been in operation for 18 months and evaluations are not due until 2021, a recent commentary by academics at the Australian National University noted that the PLS is resource-intensive, involving marketing to prospective industries and employers, supporting employer recruitment efforts, and preparing workers to participate and mobilize. Six industries including hospitality, aged care and meat processing are currently participating in the PLS and there are good indications of broader employer interest.

Sources: <https://www.immigration.govt.nz/about-us/research-and-statistics/research-reports/recognised-seasonal-employer-rse-scheme>; John Gibson, David McKenzie and Halahingano Rohorua, 2014 *Development Impacts of Seasonal and Temporary Migration: A Review of Evidence from the Pacific and Southeast Asia. Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies. Volume 1, Issue 1*; World Bank. 2018. *Maximizing the Development Impacts from Temporary Migration: Recommendations for Australia's Seasonal Worker Programme*. Washington, DC: World Bank. Chatter, Priya; Utz, Anuja; Sharma, Manohar; Doyle, Jesse Jon Gerome. 2018. *The social impacts of seasonal migration: lessons from Australia's seasonal worker program for Pacific Islanders (English)*. Washington, DC: World Bank Group; <https://devpolicy.org/australias-seasonal-worker-program-now-bigger-than-nzs-20190725/>; <https://devpolicy.org/the-pacific-labour-scheme-is-it-a-flop-20190729/>



UNDP Lebanon/Dalia Khamissy

An evolving agenda on international migration

When the Human Development Report of 2009 was written, international migration was not at the top of the international policy agenda, and it had only just gained a foothold in the United Nations. On issues of human mobility, countries of migrant origin, mostly in the global South, and countries of destination, mostly in the global North, often regarded each other with suspicion. Discussions of migration in UN committees were rancorous and many states preferred to avoid the topic altogether. To the extent that it was discussed at all, migration was treated as a problem to be solved rather than a phenomenon to be managed. The 2009 Human Development Report broke new ground by focusing on the value of human mobility—both its instrumental value as an enabler of development and its intrinsic value as an aspect of human freedom.

In the decade since, the migration agenda has evolved. A sense of urgency was brought about by dramatic migration events around the world: the inclusion of

millions of central European citizens into the EU zone of free movement, the huge refugee flows from Syria, the exodus from Venezuela's economic collapse and political turmoil, the flight of the Rohingya and the northward trek of Central American families in search of better opportunities and safety, to name only a few. Longer-term trends in displacement reinforced the imperative to address migration in the international arena, particularly those related to rapid-onset and slower moving disasters, many of them associated with the effects of climate change. One lesson from these events and trends is that no state, however capable, can accurately predict future migration, nor successfully manage it alone.

Building slowly, a broad intergovernmental consensus has emerged around the outlines for international cooperation on movements of people. There were many mileposts along this journey, including two High-Level Dialogues at the United Nations,

12 meetings of the Global Forum on Migration and Development, the inclusion of mobility as an adaptation to climate change in the deliberations surrounding the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, a highly influential report of the then-Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Migration¹⁷⁸ and a special UN Summit and Declaration, several of which are discussed below. This consensus crystallized in two Global Compacts adopted at the end of 2018: the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration and the Global Compact on Refugees. But even as this consensus developed at the global level, it has started to show cracks.

This chapter reviews the policy frameworks that states have developed since 2010 to guide international cooperation on migration and displacement. It also highlights some of the major contextual changes to which these frameworks have had to respond, including a deeper understanding of the relationship between migration and development.

International migration policy frameworks

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), covering the period 2000–2015, did not mention migration. This was despite the fact that, even then, migrants' remittances accounted for larger foreign exchange flows into most developing countries than earnings from commodity sales, foreign direct investment or trade earnings, all of which were mentioned.

At the turn of the century, attitudes about migration were at best ambivalent among both developed and developing countries. Concerns about the emigration of skilled people (the so-called “brain drain”), the separation of families and the burden of immigrants on public services were offset by expectations about the potential benefits of migration. Some regarded migration as a symptom of development failure.

The SDGs adopted a more positive attitude toward mobility. Adopted in 2015 as part of the UN Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development, the SDGs made a place for migration, including “safe, orderly, regular and responsible migration” as one of the 169 targets under the 17 SDGs (Target 10.7). Another target aimed to lower the cost of remittances (10.c) and others mentioned migrants, migration or trafficking (including 4.b, 5.2, 8.7, 8.8, 16.2 and 17.18). Although migration was not central to Agenda 2030, it recognized, for the first time in an internationally negotiated and agreed document, “the positive contribution of migration for inclusive development.”¹⁷⁹

Agenda 2030 and the SDG goals, targets and indicators made few specific references to migrants and displaced persons, although it noted that forced displacement of people is one of the factors that “threatens to reverse the development progress made in recent decades” (paragraph 14) and declared, “Those whose needs are reflected in the Agenda include...refugees and internally displaced persons and migrants.” (paragraph 23). States committed themselves to “cooperate internationally to insure safe, orderly and

regular migration involving full respect for human rights and the humane treatment of migrants regardless of migration status, of refugees and displaced persons” (paragraph 29). SDG 16 pledging to promote peaceful and inclusive societies obviously has great bearing on the prevention of forced displacement, and the displaced, like other migrants, are encompassed in Agenda 2030’s overarching commitment to “leave no one behind”.

Goal 5 on gender equality and women and girls’ empowerment is also directly relevant to human mobility, including the commitment to recognize and value care work, while Goal 8 on growth and decent work includes protection of labour rights, important for migrants, particularly women and children, who are at greater risk of exploitation or abuse. As outlined above, female migrants in stereotypically feminine roles (such as live-in care and domestic work) are frequently isolated and therefore more vulnerable to exploitation, violence and abuse.¹⁸⁰

Alongside the SDGs, in 2015 States adopted the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA) on Financing for Development, which recognized “the positive contribution of migrants for inclusive growth and sustainable development in countries of origin and transit and destination countries,” particularly the role of remittances in helping to meet the needs of migrants’ families. The participating States pledged to work to reduce the high costs of remittances and to make affordable financial services available to migrants and their families, while reducing other obstacles to remittance flows.¹⁸¹ In the same year, 109 states

endorsed the Nansen Initiative Protection Agenda, which offered guidance on preventing, preparing for and responding to cross-border displacement caused by disasters. This led to the creation of the Platform for Disaster Displacement, a State-led effort to implement the Protection Agenda.

Even as the SDGs were being negotiated and adopted, migration emergencies were developing in the Bay of Bengal, the Gulf of Aden and, most visibly, the Mediterranean.¹⁸² A collective sense of crisis gave rise to a special UN summit on large movements of migrants and refugees in September 2016. There, States agreed unanimously, in the “New York Declaration,” to negotiate a Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (echoing the formulation of SDG Target 10.7), as well as a Global Compact on Refugees. Some States and other stakeholders had hoped that the two streams of people on the move would be dealt with in a single framework, recognizing the reality of mixed migration. But two contradictory concerns kept the two streams separate: one, that combining them could erode refugee protection and, two, that it could extend refugee protections (and therefore States’ obligations) to larger groups of people on the move.

The Global Compact on Refugees set in motion a more equitable system of burden-sharing, designed to mitigate the pressure on front-line States exposed to unregulated flows of people displaced by war and persecution, and to create more opportunities for refugees. The Global Compact for Migration is based on the principle that international cooperation is a prerequisite for safe, orderly and regular migration,

and that well-managed migration is beneficial; in it, States pledge to cooperate and partner with all major stakeholders in implementing the compact.¹⁸³


The two compacts moved forward on separate tracks. The Global Compact on Refugees stayed within the existing framework of the 1951 Refugee Convention, while focusing attention on the need for burden-sharing. UNHCR went into the 2016 summit with a “Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework” already drafted, consulted upon and ready for adoption; in fact, it was already being piloted in several countries. After consultations with States and a wide range of other stakeholders, the compact was presented by UNHCR to the UN General Assembly as part of its regular annual reporting in December 2018, where it was adopted by a vote of 181-2, with three abstentions. (Only Hungary and the United States voted against the Refugee Compact, while the Dominican Republic, Eritrea, Libya and abstained.)¹⁸⁴ The Refugee Compact focuses on burden-sharing, with an agenda that emphasized four elements:

- easing the strains on host countries and communities
- promoting refugee self-reliance
- expanding the range and availability of third-country solutions for refugees
- supporting the conditions that would permit safe and dignified return to countries of origin

If the Global Compact on Refugees was evolutionary, the Global Compact on Refugees for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration was closer to revolutionary. It was written by State representatives rather than international civil servants and went through six rounds

Figure 4.1: Votes on the Compact for Migration in the UN General Assembly December 18, 2018

Percentage of the total vote and number of States voting for each option



The countries voting against the Compact were Czechia, Hungary, Israel, Poland and the United States. Algeria, Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Chile, Italy, Latvia, Libya, Lichtenstein, Romania, Singapore and Switzerland abstained.

Source: United Nations, “United Nations officially adopts roadmap for migrants to improve safety, ease suffering,” UN News, December 19, 2018. <https://un.org/en/story/2018/12/1028941>

of arduous negotiations in which all but one of the Member States of the United Nations participated (the United States pulled out of the Migration Compact process in December 2017, just before formal negotiations began).

Unlike the Refugee Compact, there was no 70-year history of broad international agreement and cooperation to support the Migration Compact. Never before had States formally negotiated and adopted such a comprehensive set of principles and objectives to guide international cooperation on migration. An extraordinary conference of Member States, with 164 governments in attendance, adopted the final text without dissent in Marrakech, Morocco, in December 2018, and it was subsequently endorsed at the December 2018 session of the General Assembly by a vote of 152-5, with 12 states abstaining.¹⁸⁵

The vision articulated in the Migration Compact said, “Migration has been part of the human experience throughout history, and we recognize that it is a source of prosperity, innovation and sustainable development in our globalized world, and that these positive impacts can be optimized by improving migration governance.”¹⁸⁶ The compact was organized around 23 objectives, which laid out a broad agenda for collaboration among governments and other key stakeholders, ranging from specific goals like improving data on migration (Objective 1) to very broad ones such as strengthening international cooperation and global partnerships for safe, orderly and regular migration (Objective 23). (See Annex to chapter 4.)

The breadth of the agenda covered by the Migration Compact could accommodate the main concerns held by countries of origin, destination and transit from different geographic regions, different levels of development and with different views on migration. It represented not so much a compromise as an inclusive menu in which almost all States could recognize their priorities and form coalitions with other States with the same or overlapping priorities.

The two Global Compacts align closely with the six pillars of HDR 2009, although with less attention to internal mobility for migrants. About two thirds of the Migration Compact’s 23 objectives address development issues, broadly conceived, either through commitments to reduce the negative factors that compel people to leave their homes or commitments that would increase the benefits of migration to individuals, communities and countries. The other third are concerned with more orderly migration, achieved through better understanding of its dynamics, more effective policies and greater international cooperation.¹⁸⁷ The Migration Compact does not deal directly with the issue of internal mobility, but the Refugee Compact’s determination to promote refugee self-reliance implies greater freedom of movement within countries of refuge.

In February 2019, the President of the General Assembly noted at an SDG review meeting that “migration and sustainable development are deeply interconnected” and predicted that the 2030 agenda will not be achieved unless efforts “comprehensively

BOX 4.1 Action on internal displacement

At the beginning of 2019, 41.3 million people were displaced within their own countries by conflict, violence and disasters. This was two-thirds more than the number of refugees, and yet little progress has been made in dealing with internal displacement since the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement were adopted in 1998. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) were not included in the global compacts on refugees and migration, although many of the principles and objectives of the compacts are just as relevant to them. But national sovereignty has acted as a barrier to acting on principles of protection and robust cooperation to benefit existing IDPs and prevent new displacements. Recognizing this gap and acknowledging that humanitarian action alone is an inadequate response to internal displacement, a new multi-stakeholder initiative was launched as a three-year Plan of Action for Advancing Prevention, Protection and Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons, 2018–2020. It aims to provide protection, assistance and durable solutions to help IDPs, and to spur more inclusive, coherent and strategic action on internal displacement.

It is clear that the affected States must be in the lead and incorporate action on internal displacement within national development plans and strategies. Nonetheless, a broad coalition of stakeholders, including UN country teams and humanitarian coordinators as well as civil society and private sector actors are well placed to help gather the necessary data, track national progress, set up preparedness and prevention initiatives and promote social and economic inclusion of IDPs. With growing numbers of IDPs living in cities, municipal governments have a crucial role.

The UN Secretary-General established a High-level Panel on Internal Displacement in October 2019. Its task is to find long-term solutions for IDPS and their host communities.

Sources: Internal Displacement Monitoring Center: <https://www.internal-displacement.org/publications/2019-global-report-on-internal-displacement>; United Nations: <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/personnel-appointments/2019-12-03/high-level-panel-internal-displacement>

include migrants in policies and programmes to expand access to education, health services, housing and basic services to build peaceful and inclusive societies.”¹⁸⁸

Another feature of the evolving migration debate over the past decade is a more inclusive agenda-setting process. Civil society representatives slowly expanded their foothold in the annual state-led Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD), which met for the first time in Brussels, Belgium, in 2007, outside the UN framework. The civil society and government forums were initially separate, with a formal touchpoint in the closing sessions. This changed in 2010, when the chair instituted a “Common Space” where civil society and governments participated on an equal footing. From that point, the interaction between the two parts of the GFMD became more prominent, and civil society took an active role in the 2013 High-Level Dialogue on Migration at the UN. Its Ten-Point Plan of Action was closely echoed in the official outcome document of the HLD.

In 2015, the GFMD began exploring the addition of a “Business Mechanism”, which was incorporated into the 2016 summit. As the role of cities in receiving and integrating migrants gained greater visibility, the GFMD added a “Mayors’ Mechanism” in 2019. These extensions helped to better reflect the real-world dynamics of migration. The negotiators of the Migration Compact similarly expanded consultations beyond only States, seeking input from civil society, the private sector and municipal governments. For example, the mayor of Montreal was a keynote speaker at the

stocktaking conference at the midpoint of the Migration Compact process.

As these agreements were finalized, however, a backlash developed among political forces, mostly in Europe, who portrayed the compacts (especially the Migration Compact) as a threat to national sovereignty, despite the compact’s clear statement of principle reaffirming “the sovereign rights of States to determine their national migration policy.”¹⁸⁹ The strong consensus that supported the compacts has eroded as political parties have gained influence and power in many countries on anti-immigrant and anti-multilateralist platforms, most notably in Central Europe (Austria, Czechia, Hungary and Poland), Italy and the United States. These developments have also raised the stakes of successful implementation of the compacts. To ensure continued support, concrete achievements are needed to demonstrate that international cooperation offers the best way to solve problems and leverage the benefits of migration, at both the national and international levels.

The SDGs and the Global Compacts may be seen as politically and even morally binding, but they are not legally binding. States have continued to show a marked aversion to the adoption of legally binding instruments relating to migration: Those that exist experience low rates of ratification. The most recent legally binding instrument to be adopted was ILO Convention 189, the Domestic Workers’ Convention (applying to a sector in which many of the workers are immigrants), which came into force in 2013, but it is

ratified by only 29 states.¹⁹⁰ It appears that non-binding agreements underpinned by strong international consensus may be more effective than conventions that bind only the few States that have formally accepted them.

The migration-development link

As the migration agenda evolved, so did the development agenda. Recognition has grown over the past decade that migration can play an important role in reducing poverty, strengthening community resilience, shoring up financial stability at the national level and integrating developing countries into global networks of knowledge and commerce. Indeed, it was by framing migration as a development issue that migration was first brought into the United Nations for high-level general debate, at the 2006 High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development, as migration alone was still regarded as too contentious. The early migration and development discussions were focused on a rather narrow concept of development, with the emphasis on the economic benefits of migration—particularly the financial flows of migrants’ remittances.

While the importance of remittances in supporting household income, noted in Chapter 3, provided the first incontrovertible evidence of the importance of migration for development, research over the last decade has provided evidence of the broader development impacts of remittances. It is estimated that about three quarters of remittances are used for immediate needs by the receivers, but about a

quarter are saved or invested. During the 2015–2030 period covered by the SDGs, if the current trend continues, \$8.5 trillion will be transferred to developing countries, producing more than \$2 trillion in savings and investments. In addition to supporting private household consumption and investment, remittances also bolster national accounts by providing the foreign exchange inflows that finance imports and boost sovereign credit ratings—saving developing countries millions of dollars in interest costs.

Beyond remittances, both donor governments and authorities in developing countries have come to appreciate the other ways that migrants contribute to development—of countries of destination as well as countries of origin. A 2016 report from the McKinsey Global Institute estimated that international migrants—about 3.2 percent of the world’s population in 2015—generated 9 percent of global GDP.¹⁹¹

As noted in the previous chapter, many states have established institutions within government to cultivate ties with their diaspora populations, including upper-middle and high-income countries such as Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Moldova and New Zealand as well as lower-middle and low-income countries such as Ethiopia, Haiti and India. Some of the most rapid ascents in national development, such as those in China and the Republic of Korea, have been built in part on migration (especially for higher education) and diaspora engagement.

The growing recognition of the potential benefits of migration for development in the first decade of

this century, as outlined in Chapter 2, led to the UN's Global Migration Group (2006–2018) developing guidance on migration for UN Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAFs). A handbook for policymakers and practitioners (“Mainstreaming Migration into Development Planning”) was published in 2010, and from 2014, IOM and UNDP co-chaired a working group on Mainstreaming Migration into National Development Strategies. But heightened awareness has been translated into concrete policy direction in very few countries.

The inclusion of migration in Agenda 2030 and the adoption of the Global Compact for Migration have given greater impetus to efforts to mainstream migration. In 2016, the UN and IOM agreed for IOM to become a related agency of the UN system and part of the UN Sustainable Development Group, which gave the UN system greatly enhanced capacity in migration. The UN Network on Migration, launched in 2018 with the Director-General of IOM as coordinator, is designed to support Member States in implementing the Migration Compact, drawing on the full range of expertise within the UN system.¹⁹² It has an Executive Committee of eight agencies, programmes and offices¹⁹³ with 30 additional members. The network's objectives include acting as a source of reliable data, information, tools, ideas, analysis and policy guidance on migration issues, thereby tackling some of the major obstacles to effective national policymaking on migration and development.

Since the 2009 HDR, a broader set of ideas about what constitutes development, in line with UNDP's

conception of human development, has entered migration debates. The evolution of the 2030 Agenda and the recent compacts reveal that many States that were extremely reluctant to discuss issues like human rights, environmental degradation and root causes in the context of migration have acquired experience in doing so without provoking North-South confrontations, often in the context of the GFMD.

More important, it has become clear that most people seek the freedom to pursue the kind of life they choose, whether they decide to move or stay in place. Supports to enable pursuit of this kind of freedom include access to education, good health, a secure livelihood and accountable governments. These things, combined with a social and political environment that is perceived as fair and rewards honest effort, may persuade many people that they can pursue their goals at home. They are also some of the major goals of development. But as explained earlier, it is simplistic to draw a straight line between development and reduced migration.

Development can reduce migration pressures, but it is also likely to provide more people with the means to move. And if development is not inclusive, and its benefits are poorly distributed, it may aggravate the sense of grievance that motivates many people to move. While the impact of development on migration is not straightforward, we know much more about the impact of migration, in its different dimensions, on development. Remittances are well understood as a force for poverty reduction at the individual and household level, human capital building and financial stabilization (through foreign exchange receipts

originating in migrants' remittances) at the national level. We have a better understanding of how to avoid the dangers of asset inflation and dependency associated with remittances. Skilled emigration has been revealed by careful research to be as much a symptom as a cause of underdevelopment.¹⁹⁴ Sophistication about how to establish productive two-way relationships with diasporas has grown. As the migration and development agenda has evolved, it has become clearer that migration can be an important enabler of development, although never a substitute for sound development policy.

Enhanced information and opportunities

The migration experience has changed considerably over the course of this century, and the rate of change continues to accelerate. The rapid growth of mobile communications technology has made the greatest difference—particularly the diffusion of cheaper mobile phones that allow people to learn about possible destination places, plot their journeys, keep in touch with friends and family, and send money home once they start earning. According to Statista, a provider of marketing and consumer data, two thirds of the world's people have a wireless mobile device, and 43 percent have a smartphone.¹⁹⁵ Increasing numbers of users are able to search for a job, compare the charges of money-transfer operators, read ratings of recruitment agents and get real-time information about the opportunities or dangers posed by migration middlemen.

Mobile phones also open up financial services at low cost to huge numbers of people, including migrants. In 2009, as the HDR was published, Kenya's mobile banking service M-Pesa was only two years old, but was already used by 17 percent of the population.¹⁹⁶ By 2013, 93 percent of Kenya's people were registered for M-Pesa and 60 percent were active users, including the very poor: 72 percent of those living on less than \$1.25 per day used M-Pesa. In addition to money transfer, the service also provided financial services such as start-up loans for small businesses.¹⁹⁷

Not all hopeful migrants can avail themselves of mobile information and communications technology (ICT). In 2019, half the world's population still has no access to the internet, and women are more likely than men to be excluded. Cost is the main barrier. The Alliance for Affordable Internet Access calculates the cost of one gigabyte of data as a proportion of average monthly income in various world regions; in central Africa, it is 12 percent, more than 8 percent in western Africa and over 7 percent in eastern Africa.¹⁹⁸

The global competition for skills

Another ongoing change in the migration sphere is the heightened global competition for skilled migrants. Immigration policies of sought-after countries of destination—like Canada and the United Kingdom—are becoming more selective, favouring people with tertiary education, technical skills or outstanding talent in the arts, sports and other fields. The skill level

of global migration flows has been rising over time, in an alignment of supply (more tertiary-educated people in the world population) and demand (rising needs for highly-skilled workers in today's rapidly evolving knowledge economies). Highly skilled migrants are likely to face fewer financial, language or administrative barriers to immigration than less skilled people. But skills flows are highly concentrated, with two-thirds of such migrants going to just four highly industrialized English-speaking countries: United States, United Kingdom, Canada and Australia.¹⁹⁹ The top 10 destination countries for skilled migrants, including these four, take in three quarters of all migrants. The sources of migrants are much less concentrated.

The implications of highly-skilled migration for both source and destination countries are hard to separate out from other influences on the labour market and the broader economy. As the World Bank points out, the evidence on the impact of highly-skilled migration is weak, in large part owing to the poor quantity and quality of relevant data.²⁰⁰ But a strong counter-narrative to the classic "brain drain" story of skilled migration has emerged in the work of economists such as Frédéric Docquier, Hillel Rapoport, Michael Clemens and Tito Boeri.²⁰¹ Both theoretical and empirical research shows that migration of the highly skilled does not necessarily deplete a country's human resources and can bring development benefits through diaspora effects and by persuading more people (who may not emigrate) to invest in education (often funded by remittance income). Negative effects of highly-skilled emigration are felt most severely by small, isolated and/or conflict-affected countries.

The advanced economies compete for skilled migrants, especially in medicine and the STEM fields. It is difficult for late country entrants to catch up, as the agglomeration effect dictates that immigration "hotspots" generate externalities of higher productivity and synergies from network effects that are hard to replicate from scratch. Germany, which earlier tried and failed to attract the highly skilled, in June 2019 passed a new law designed to increase the annual intake of skilled immigrants by 25,000. The law is particularly designed to attract doctors, physiotherapists, nurses, IT specialists, engineers, construction craftsmen, electrical and aerospace engineers and other STEM professionals. The prerequisite of a university degree or professional training recognized in Germany will narrow the pool, as will the German language proficiency requirement for some categories.²⁰² Some experts predict that as the race for talent intensifies, the selection process will give skilled migrants the choice of countries rather than the other way around.²⁰³

In sum, the past decade has seen growing international cooperation on migration, not only on the rhetorical heights of Agenda 2030 the New York Declaration and the Global Compacts. States are, increasingly finding common ground, not only with each other but with civil society and private sector partners, local governments and international organizations. The thematic working streams of the UN Network on Migration are being formed on the basis of multi-stakeholder partnerships.

Canada has spearheaded an international effort to spread the concept of private sponsorship of refugees, based on its own longstanding and highly successful

model. Several other countries as well as philanthropic supporters, think tanks and NGOs are participating. Germany has formed a partnership with several countries of origin to pilot a model of integrated return and reintegration. As outlined in Chapter 3, Australia collaborates with Pacific Island States in an effort to increase the pool of skilled labour to work in technical jobs.²⁰⁴

It is likely that more bilateral and multilateral partnerships will form under the aegis of the Migration Compact. The events of the last decade has shown that collaboration can reduce risks and increase payoffs from innovation in migration policy and practice—and unlock tremendous potential gains from increased human mobility.



UNDP/Aurélia Rusek

Looking ahead to the next decade—how human mobility can advance human development

The Human Development Report of 2009 started from the premise that mobility—the freedom to choose one’s location—has both intrinsic and instrumental value to human beings. In the intervening decade, evidence to support that premise has continued to mount. The potential benefits are more widely appreciated by policymakers and programme designers. Great progress has been made, as outlined in the preceding chapter and seen in the Global Compact for Migration, toward crafting an international consensus. This emerging consensus extends to how benefits to individuals, communities and countries can be increased, how the negative factors that compel people to leave their homes can be reduced, and how the migration process can be made more orderly through better understanding made possible by improved data, more effective policies and greater cooperation among

countries. The Global Compact on Refugees also promotes both internal (within first asylum countries) and external mobility (to third countries) for refugees. There is a long way to go, however, before those gains are translated into concrete actions.

This chapter looks at the continuing relevance of the HDR 2009 pillars going forward, assesses the degree of progress made toward achieving them, and contemplates next steps to move their aims forward. It then examines some of the global trends that are changing debates on migration and displacement in fundamental ways, and will continue to do so. The chapter concludes with recommendations for policymakers, particularly those in UNDP and the UN system, on how better to address the challenges of migration and displacement.

Are HDR's 2009 pillars still relevant for the next 10 years?

Action on the six pillars of HDR 2009's core proposal varies widely, although none has lost its relevance. The following briefly revisits the pillars, reordered to start with those that have seen progress in implementation and move on to those where progress has been more elusive. Then we look ahead to the steps necessary to build momentum for further progress.

Pillar 5

While formal barriers to internal movement have almost vanished except in China, Cuba and North Korea, many informal barriers remain, particularly within large, multilingual or multinational states such as India and Russia. Barriers such as language, inaccessible social benefits and differential housing costs remain. The gains from internal mobility vary: more efficient labour markets, escape from regions with limited prospects, support for rural livelihoods from relatives who have migrated to the cities, and many more. Future policies toward internal mobility should focus on removing the informal barriers to movement.

The next step is to promote greater intraregional mobility in larger economic areas such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the East African Community (EAC), MERCOSUR and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Several countries have ratified the East African

Common Market Protocol, which provides for free movement of labour. Both EAC and ECOWAS have introduced regional passports, although implementation in ECOWAS has been slow. IGAD adopted a Free Movement Protocol in February 2020. Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda have agreed to allow national IDs for travel among the three countries, and Rwanda's cross-border trade with its two partners has increased by 50 percent as a result. The African Union adopted a Free Movement Protocol and an accompanying Plan of Action in 2018, although continent-wide freedom of movement remains a distant prospect.²⁰⁵ The Eurasian Economic Union, established in 2015, allows member nationals to live, work and study in other member countries,²⁰⁶ although many countries in the region are concerned about the dominance of the regional hegemonic power. Free movement within a region brings economic benefits in trade, investment and employment. The OECD reports, for example, that the average unemployment rate in Europe is 6 percent lower as a result of free movement within the EU.²⁰⁷

Pillar 6

Progress has been made in incorporating migration into national development strategies, although much remains to be done. One helpful development is the greater integration of migration into the UN development system, working through the UN Network on Migration and the UN country teams, which will equip UN agencies and programmes to provide more consistent advice on how to maximize the benefits of migration for both the origin country and migrants. The

inclusion of IOM in the UN system as a related agency strengthens its ability to contribute to these processes, although the organization participated in some UN country teams before this.

An important obstacle to “mainstreaming” migration in development planning is that almost all the effort surrounding this goal is directed to countries of origin. Few destination countries, even those that host large immigrant and diaspora populations, have organized programming to boost the impact of immigration on development. Donor governments could do more to include members of transnational networks, particularly their own diaspora residents, in their development planning, taking advantage of the diaspora’s specialized knowledge of the opportunities and obstacles in their countries of origin or ancestry.

Pillar 4

The 2009 HDR emphasized that migration should be a “win-win” phenomenon for both migrants and destination communities. Ten years later, discussions more commonly talk about a “triple win” in which benefits are shared among migrants, countries of destination and countries of origin—but with less focus at the community level. This evolution initially arose out of concern about “brain drain,” and triple-win projects have been designed to provide training, experience and/or earnings to skilled foreigners who work abroad. Germany’s original “Triple Win Project” has focused on recruiting nurses from countries that educate more nurses than the local labour market can absorb; in the

first instance, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Philippines, Serbia and Tunisia are the partner countries. Germany gains from the ability to fill its nursing vacancies, the partners gain from reduced unemployment as well as the migrant nurses’ remittances, and the nurses gain from recognition of their professional qualifications and higher wages than they would earn at home.²⁰⁸

Pillar 3

Lowering transaction costs for migrant workers has gained a great deal of attention at the international level, with remittance fees even being assigned a separate SDG target (10.c). Yet remittance costs remain stubbornly high, averaging almost 7 percent of the amount remitted—more than twice the SDG target. Lowering remittance costs remains an urgent task for the coming years. In addition to lower transaction costs for money transfer, another indicator adopted to measure progress toward SDG 10.7 on facilitating safe, orderly, regular and responsible migration is recruitment costs borne by a migrant worker as a proportion of yearly income earned in the country of destination. A standardized methodology for measuring this has yet to be finalized. ILO and the World Bank have been conducting small-sample surveys to measure recruitment costs in certain migration corridors, and both ILO and IOM have initiatives to regulate recruitment costs and eliminate abuses. Less attention has gone to national policies and procedures that result in high costs for documentation such as passports and visas. In short, there is much attention to reducing transaction costs but relatively little by way

of results so far. Great potential remains for action on transaction costs to increase the share of the gains from migration that actually go to migrants themselves.

Pillar 2

Ensuring migrants' rights remains the primary responsibility of countries of destination. Progress varies widely according to their willingness and capability to extend various rights to migrants and to protect, promote and fulfil those rights. Migrants' access to public services (beyond children's education, which is widely accepted although not realized in all settings) and safety net programmes remains especially contentious. International treaties on migrants' rights have low rates of ratification and weak guarantees of compliance.

Migrants are entitled along with everyone else to core human rights, but often find it difficult to access their rights or to seek redress if their rights are violated. Irregular migrants are particularly at risk. Some labour organizations look at migrant workers as potential competitors for jobs, but many have come to recognize that violations of migrants' labour rights put all workers in jeopardy, and that it is in their own interests to protect the rights of migrant workers. Labour unions and other civil society organizations are often the most effective defenders of migrants' rights. The right to family life, articulated in the Convention on the Rights of the Child, is often disrupted by migration restrictions. Highly skilled migrants are more often allowed to

bring family with them, making the right to family life a privilege of the already privileged.

Pillar 1

Finally, the response to HDR 2009's call to liberalize and simplify regular channels of migration, particularly for low-skilled migrants, has been meagre. In some corridors, the reverse is true. For example, first-residence permits for work in the EU-28 granted to Africans actually declined from about 80,000 in 2010 to 26,000 in 2016.²⁰⁹ The United States has increased admissions through its temporary seasonal visa program for low-skilled agricultural workers, but not because the programme was liberalized or simplified. The H-2A seasonal visa program for agricultural workers was not used much by employers, who found it cumbersome and costly to access, until the supply of irregular Mexican farm labourers dried up (by 2015, the flow of irregular immigrants from Mexico to the United States was net negative). The number of H-2A visas issued rose from about 60,000 in 2009 to 134,000 in 2016 and 2017 and was on track for over 200,000 after the first quarter of 2017.²¹⁰ (There is no statutory limit on the number of H-2A visas.)

The AU-EU Joint Valetta Action Plan agreed in 2015 had, by the time of its 2018 review, 209 initiatives devoted to its pillar on root causes of irregular migration, forced displacement and development benefits of migration, while only 15 were devoted to its legal migration and mobility pillar.²¹¹ While highly

skilled immigrants are, as noted in the previous chapter, welcomed in most high-income countries, workers with few formal qualifications have limited opportunities for legal entry. As populations age and shrink in high-income countries, immigrant labour will continue to be needed in high-touch jobs that cannot be easily outsourced or automated. Less skilled workers' lives will be most dramatically transformed by the opportunity to work in a high-income country, even on a temporary basis. Implementation of Pillar 1 would be a true triple win.

Emerging issues

The world has changed in the past decade, in ways that have thrust some issues on the margins of the migration debate into the very centre. These include the impact of climate change on migration and displacement, the changing nature of work and how it will affect demand for migrant labour, the impact of rising inequality within and between countries, and the challenge of mixed movements.

Climate change

The 2009 HDR recognized that environmental change can be a key driver of human movement. A growing number of reports, projections and models predict that the continuing warming of the earth will generate massive population shifts both within and across national boundaries by intensifying natural hazards,

reducing crop productivity and perhaps intensifying conflicts over natural resources, among other effects. The effects of warming will join other environmental drivers of migration such as degradation of the earth's soils, forests, waterways and atmosphere caused by overuse and pollution; geophysical disasters such as earthquakes and volcanoes, and extreme weather events not related to climate change. Estimates from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre suggest that since 2008, an average of 24 million people have been internally displaced by catastrophic weather events and geophysical disasters each year.²¹²

Extreme weather has brought calamities to settings as diverse as Bangladesh, Chad and the United States, but it is the poorest and least resilient areas—and people—that suffer the worst effects. People may feel compelled to move when they are exposed to a sudden or slow-onset natural hazard, and lack the ability to withstand or recover from its impact. But the outcomes vary. In the poorest countries, the rural poor may be too poor to move. A recent paper from the National Bureau of Economic Research²¹³ using a global dataset covering 1970–2000 found that rising temperatures are associated with reduced rural-urban migration in poor countries and increased rural-urban migration in middle-income countries. The authors traced this outcome to rural-urban earnings differentials and liquidity constraints, which limit the mobility of the poor. The results suggest that the global warming will encourage further urbanization in middle-income countries such as Argentina, but could slow urban transition in poor countries like Malawi and Niger.

It is impossible to say how many people will move as a result of climate change brought on by global warming. It is possible, however, to estimate how many people are vulnerable to climate change by virtue of where they live: in low-lying coastal cities or marginal dryland farms, for example. A recent World Bank report, *Groundswell*, estimates that by 2050, 143 million people in the world's three most vulnerable regions—sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and Latin America—will be internally displaced by climate change. It concluded that, given limits on local adaptation, well-planned migration to more viable areas could be a successful strategy, if supported by a strong enabling environment for people to move to areas of low risk and greater opportunity.²¹⁴ Without such planning, people will try to find other solutions. Researchers at Columbia University have concluded that, if warming trends continue along the path of moderate projections, applications for asylum to the European Union could increase 28 percent to nearly 450,000 per year by 2100.²¹⁵

But these estimates are highly uncertain. Environmental changes interact with economic, political, cultural and demographic factors to shape how people respond to changes in their environment and what degree of choice they have in their responses. Governmental responses are also unpredictable: Will major action be taken to avert climate-related disasters, and will that action be effective? Will mitigation measures be taken in time, or will people have to adapt to radically changed circumstances?

We can say with some certainty that mobility can expand the range of adaptive choices available to

people affected by climate change.²¹⁶ Migration has always been a way for households to manage risk by diversifying their sources of income. A member living in the city or another country may supplement with remittances the declining income from agriculture, thereby enabling other family members to remain on the land. Temporary migration may finance investments, for example in improved seeds, equipment or technology, that stabilize or raise productivity in the place of origin to overcome environmental stresses. A migrant may act as the anchor for a permanent move by other family members to a less precarious setting.

Climate change is already inducing migration, mostly internal movement. Sudden-onset disasters often result in temporary migration, while the slower moving disasters may permanently undermine the viability of livelihoods and dwelling places. Lake Chad has shrunk by 90 percent over the last 40 years, as a result of recurrent drought and unsustainable withdrawals for irrigation.²¹⁷ Cities from Chennai to Cape Town have faced “Day Zero” when piped water ran dry.²¹⁸ Somalia had 850,000 new drought-related displacements in 2017 and another 250,000 in 2018. There were 3.2 million new displacements in South Asia in 2018 due to sudden-onset disasters, particularly severe storms. In the face of flooding, coastal and river-bank erosion, rising sea levels and groundwater depletion, migration is a critical coping strategy.²¹⁹ This can extend to movements beyond borders. Evidence suggests that in countries like El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, the effects of climate change are already disrupting lives and livelihoods, and forcing people to leave their homes; many join the flows heading north.²²⁰

The concept of mobility entered the discussions surrounding the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in 2010 and was introduced into the Cancun Adaptation Framework at the 16th Conference of the Parties (COP). Displacement, migration (as a form of adaptation) and planned relocation have been part of the proceedings ever since. The Paris Agreement in 2015 established a Task Force on Displacement, and in 2016, the Executive Committee included human mobility in its 5-year rolling workplan. COP 24 (2018) recommended integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement.²²¹ In the Global Compact for Migration, states commit themselves to address displacement resulting from climate change, environmental degradation and natural disasters in Objective 2 (Minimize the adverse drivers and structural factors that compel people to leave their homes) and Objective 5 (Enhance availability and flexibility of pathways for regular migration). A promising effort to establish a global framework on disaster displacement, the Nansen Initiative and the associated Platform on Disaster Displacement, deals with cross-border movement in response to severe disasters and, like the Global Compacts, is not legally binding. Migration is thus now more firmly established in the climate-change agenda, although much remains to be done to respond to this challenge.

People forced to leave their homes due to climate change generally do not benefit from the legal protections afforded to refugees, although some may be regarded as refugees.²²² However, a January 2020 decision of the UN Human Rights Committee, in the case of *Teitiota vs. New Zealand*, opened the door to

international protection for people displaced by climate change and natural disasters, under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Although the plaintiff's individual claim was denied, the Committee allowed that climate change "may expose individuals to a violation of their rights under articles 6 or 7 of the Covenant, thereby triggering state's obligation not to return an individual to a place where his or her right to life would be violated".²²³ In addition, some national governments have proposed innovative measures to aid climate migrants. Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern of New Zealand, for example, proposed a special visa for Pacific Islanders fleeing rising sea levels. This proposal was set aside, however, due to objections from people in Pacific Island States themselves, highlighting the importance of developing solutions that take into account and address the actual needs of affected populations.

Governments of countries on the front line of climate change, such as small Pacific Island States, have argued that their people should have access to "migration with dignity," with access to safe, authorized movement and a choice of whether, how, where and when to move. Meeting these challenges, along with the challenges of integrating displaced people into new communities, is likely to be one of the major tests of international solidarity in the 21st Century.

Mixed movements

Refugees, asylum seekers and other migrants have long travelled together along the same routes, using

the same means of transportation and encountering the same dangers. The motivations have been similar—the search for a better life for themselves and their families—but the degree of choice varies. In the last decade, the lines between refugees as conventionally

defined²²⁴ and other people who are forced to flee their countries are increasingly hard to detect. This has thrown into sharp relief the need to manage a range of different protection needs for growing numbers of people who may not conform to the prevailing

BOX 5.1 Exodus from Venezuela

By August 2020, 5.2 million Venezuelan people had left their country, in one of the largest and fastest mixed flows ever seen. About 85 percent of those departing went to other countries in Latin America, which have allowed Venezuelans to enter and remain legally, at least temporarily. Many Venezuelans would qualify for refugee protection, but more have benefitted from existing visa categories, migration agreements under MERCOSUR, or special regularization programmes that give temporary legal status to those who arrive without documents. The decision to apply for asylum or seek a migration status seems to depend in part upon which route is easier and cheaper. For example, when Peru started in 2018 to require Venezuelans to present a passport (difficult and costly to obtain in the current crisis) to enter the country, many Venezuelans without the document applied for asylum at the Foreign Ministry office at the main border crossing, which allowed them to continue without a passport. According to Andrew Selee and co-authors, “The response by Latin American governments has been both generous and pragmatic.” By not trying to separate refugees from other migrants, all fleeing desperate conditions at home, the countries of the region have avoided costly bureaucratic procedures, encouraged self-sufficiency, avoided refugee camps and set the stage for integration. The pace and scale of the inflow presents tremendous problems and the long-term challenges are daunting, especially given the paucity of international support. But the approach offers a number of good practices for coping with mixed flows of migrants and refugees.

Source: Andrew Selee, Jessica Bolter, Betilde Muñoz-Pergossian and Miryam Hazan, Creativity amid Crisis: Legal Pathways for Venezuelan Migrants in Latin America (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute 2019).

definition of a refugee under the UN Convention of 1951 or regional instruments such as the Cartagena Declaration and the OAU Convention.

Venezuela is a contemporary case in point (See Box 5.1), with a massive outflow of people escaping violence, insecurity and political strife as well as general economic collapse leading to shortages of food, medicine and basic services. Inflation in Venezuela reached 1.3 million percent in 2018.²²⁵ By June 2020, according to the Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela, 5.1 million Venezuelan people had fled their country; these numbers do not include the many returnees who had migrated to Venezuela in the previous decades and are now compelled to return to their origin countries. About 85 percent of migrants from Venezuela remained within the region, Colombia being the main host country.²²⁶ While an increasing proportion are refugees according to the criteria in the 1951 UN Convention and the 1984 Cartagena Declaration (as well as the status of non-refoulement in customary international law), many other Venezuelans are fleeing extreme economic hardship. Regardless of their legal status however, vast numbers of people desperately needing assistance, protection and prospects for the future have been arriving in other countries.

This presents the international community with an enormous challenge. Societies that become polarized along ethnic or communal lines, where the government fails to deliver on the most basic elements of the social contract, also accelerate people's desire to seek better prospects elsewhere. In some countries, such as those

in northern Central America, extensive criminal violence has made their communities so unsafe that people are forced to find alternative places to live and work. While UNHCR regards many of them as refugees, some States refuse to accord them that status. People leaving their homes in response to various negative drivers of migration often merge with forcibly displaced persons escaping persecution in similar contexts.

The future of work

The development of powerful new technologies like artificial intelligence and machine learning will have a profound impact on the labour market of the future, in ways that are not fully understood.²²⁷ The skill profile of the labour force is bound to change, with demand remaining robust both at the high and low ends of the skills spectrum. On the high end, knowledge-intensive professions will demand flexibility and continuous learning along with sophisticated technical and analytical skills. At the other end, jobs that must be done in person or on the spot, ranging from childcare and elder-care to landscaping, are more difficult to automate. Automation, computerization and advanced robotics is expected to speed the decline of many mid-skilled jobs in manufacturing and services. New kinds of work will be required even as some old ones dwindle, and many traditional jobs will be replaced by task-specific hiring in the 'gig' economy. As new technology enables jobs with previously unheard-of levels of productivity, questions of income distribution and safety nets will come to the fore.²²⁸

These changes are likely to have major implications for immigration.²²⁹ As noted in the preceding chapter, competition for recruitment of highly skilled professionals from abroad is intensifying. At the same time, many native-born workers may continue to resist low-paying jobs in services, agriculture and other low-productivity sectors—especially if they have alternative means of gaining an income—sustaining the demand for less-skilled immigrants.

In the past, technological change has produced great churning in the labour market. The hyper-automation and digitalization of the “fourth industrial revolution” may follow the same pattern. As one example, the introduction of the automated teller machine changed the jobs of bank tellers but did not reduce their numbers; rather, they turned to enhanced customer service and sales of new products. Job churning is already a fact, as physical retail locations give way to on-line shopping and fast-food service is increasingly automated. Dirty and dangerous jobs like meatpacking are probably next in line for automation.

Policy responses to the changing nature of work will vary, with some countries trying to automate as a way to reduce the demand for low-skilled labour—as seen, for example, in the increasing use of robotic assistants and even companions for the elderly in Japan. Other countries, like Germany, have opened their labour markets more widely to immigrants as way to maintain services for their aging populations. Change is the only certain thing, and it will affect those seen as outsiders most profoundly.

Rising inequality

Inequality within and between countries—of income, opportunity, public services, safety and life prospects—is widely seen as a major driver of migration. When people feel that they will remain disadvantaged compared to those around them, they are often motivated to move.²³⁰

Some see migration is a consequence as well as a cause of inequality, as households with migrants get ahead of those without, thereby exacerbating inequality within countries.

Opinion about the impact of international migration on inequality is divided. Some see it as a powerful way to reduce inequality among people in developing versus industrialized countries. It is certainly true that the movement of people is a key way to close gaps in different dimensions of human development, as documented in the 2009 HDR and outlined in Chapter 2. This is also the implicit assumption behind SDG Target 10.7, which locates the commitment to “facilitate safe, orderly, regular and responsible migration” within the commitment to “reduce inequality within and among countries.” Holders of this view characterize inequality as the prime mover of migration, and migration as one of the most effective means to reduce inequality.²³¹

Others see migration as a central pillar of a liberal global economic system that leads to the super-concentration of wealth and power—not just in a few developed countries but in a handful of

agglomerations within them where capital, technology and highly skilled labour meet; thus it contributes to inequality within countries as well as among them. In this view, skilled migration is yet another facet of globalization’s tendency to concentrate wealth and resources in a few countries.²³² Some see immigration controls as an important instrument for maintaining global inequalities and limiting human freedom.²³³

The impact of migration on inequality is context-specific. It depends on who migrates, their position in the origin country’s labour market, what they send or bring back and whether they are able to work to their potential in the country of destination. Policy matters as well, helping to determine whether migrants’ credentials are recognized, and their rights are protected.

Implications for the UNDP and the international community: How to better address migration and displacement?

The 2009 Human Development Report, Agenda 2030 and the SDGs, the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, the Global Compact on Refugees and other documents that address global migration, provide important guidance to the international community on key goals. These documents are broadly consistent in their analyses of *what* needs to be done to promote the gains and reduce the negative effects of migration, while preventing forcible displacement.

Yet, *how* to better address migration and displacement is much more elusive. This is partly because the migration policy debate usually focuses on migration itself, whereas the most powerful levers that can shift migration patterns are not found in migration policy, but in structural determinants such as relative levels of productivity, education and skills, wage and income differentials, social mobility, the existence and strength of social safety nets, and many other factors. Hein De Haas and collaborators in the “Determinants of Migration” research project question how effective migration policy changes can be in the face of such structural determinants.²³⁴ The potential effectiveness of migration policy is further challenged by the increasing effects of climate change and environmental degradation and the likelihood that future technology-driven gains in productivity will accrue to highly skilled workers in richer countries rather than to the much more numerous unskilled workers in poor countries.

The importance of structural factors in migration dynamics points to the comparative advantage of UNDP and other development institutions in addressing migration. UNDP is increasingly asked by the countries with which it works to help them tackle the consequences—positive or negative—of migration, not only in countries of origin, but also of transit and destination. Development agencies also have expertise to help address the deep-seated drivers of migration, which are often the same factors that are obstacles to human development: poverty, poor governance, lack

of access to education and services, inadequate job creation and so forth. These are largely beyond the reach of migration policy, going much deeper into a country's whole policy environment.

The last decade of programming to reduce the costs and increase the benefits of migration for developing countries have generally yielded modest results. A new approach is required, particularly in relation to the negative drivers of migration such as inequality, climate change and poor governance. These are difficult issues. But there are exceptions to some of the overall patterns.

As noted earlier, the cost of sending remittances to Africa have remained stubbornly high, and the global average is more than twice as high as the long-standing target of 3 percent. But remittance transfers within the Commonwealth of Independent States (mostly from the Russian Federation to former Soviet Republics) are much lower than the global average: The average cost of remitting money from Russia was the lowest in the world in 2018, at 1.9 percent.²³⁵ Why are transaction costs for sending money so much lower in Russia? Why is the Republic of Georgia one of the few countries that has made substantial progress in moving from a high-corruption country to a much lower level of corruption? Why has emigration from Mexico to the United States not only slowed but reversed direction?

Migration and development policy could usefully borrow from sociology the concept of “positive deviance,” which is “based on the observation that in every community there are certain individuals or

groups whose uncommon behaviours and strategies enable them to find better solutions to problems than their peers, while having access to the same resources and facing similar or worse challenges. The Positive Deviance approach enables the community to discover these successful behaviours and strategies and develop a plan of action to promote their adoption by all concerned.”²³⁶ Examples of success in addressing the negative drivers of migration are rare but they can be found, and these examples should be scrutinized to try to understand what made them different from the average, and whether they can be replicated in other settings. Development partners should search out the positive counter-examples and invest in them.

1 Identify the dynamics of migration and forced displacement

An investment in understanding the dynamics of migration and forced displacement is an essential prerequisite to sound policy, and this is something that the international community can help countries to do. Indeed, it is one of the key objectives of the Global Compact for Migration. UNDP's *Scaling Fences* report is a step in this direction. Better understanding of what motivates people to move—both the negative drivers and the positive attractions—helps clarify what irregular migrants are trying to accomplish by migrating. Are there other ways they can meet those goals? For example, having a family member migrate to work in another country often acts as a form of insurance against livelihood failure in the country/community of origin. Could community-based or micro-insurance

schemes fill this need, for less money than families must invest to pay for the journey abroad (transport, loss of local earnings, smuggler’s fees, etc.), and with less risk?

It is critical to collect data that allows better understanding of the heterogeneity of people who move, including differences between women and men. Policy responses can help amplify the empowerment effects of migration and mitigate increased vulnerabilities if the specific needs of different women and girls, as well as men and boys, in different countries are understood, and policy and programmes tailored accordingly.²³⁷

Scaling Fences identified barriers to opportunity, quoting novelist Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie’s formulation of “choicelessness,” as a major influence on the decisions of young people to migrate from Africa to Europe. How can young Africans, and other intending migrants around the world, be offered a path out of the loss of hope that they can improve their life chances while remaining at home? Persistent inequality, and the corruption that often perpetuates it, undermines confidence that talent and hard work will be rewarded on their own merits.

A report released by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in November 2019 suggested a direct link between corruption and emigration. It concluded that improved governance would lead to higher productivity growth and better life satisfaction independent of higher income, which would

make people less likely to leave their home country in search of a better life elsewhere.²³⁸

Good governance is particularly important for countries in transition from low-wage economies. According to EBRD’s Chief Economist, higher value-added growth depends on innovation and entrepreneurship, which can only flourish in a good business climate with rule of law, freedom of the press, confidence in government and other attributes of good governance. Other research has indicated that one of the few forms of development assistance that is correlated with lower migration is governance assistance to promote rule of law, combat corruption and increase access to justice.²³⁹ More projects with a focus like that of the UNDP-UNHCR rule of law and local governance initiative, expanding from three to at least 20 countries, are needed. They should work with governments to narrow the huge gap between anti-corruption law and practice, and help them to acquire and master the technical means (such as artificial intelligence, blockchain and big data analytics) to detect and combat corrupt practices. Robust support for the “positive deviance” governments that are working effectively to tackle corruption may encourage others to look more carefully at their practices.

2 Policy advice and technical assistance for reduced inequality

Reducing inequality is an extremely complex task, and both positive and negative models exist among

industrialized and developing countries. Development partners should, first, help governments understand the distributive consequences of various policy options, as well as the consequences of inequality for economic growth, political stability and social cohesion.²⁴⁰ Inequality, like poverty, has many dimensions. Issues such as access to high-quality schools, university spots, technology, medical services, job training, financial services, housing and so forth may loom larger in people’s minds than income inequality. Young people often make the decision to migrate early in their lives; programmes that offer a clear trajectory from learning to earning make education relevant to the way they see their prospects.²⁴¹

Addressing inequality also involves understanding and addressing gender gaps in the constraints and opportunities for women and men, girls and boys, consistent with the SDG goal of achieving gender equality and empowering all women and girls.

The SDG pledge to reduce inequality by facilitating safe, orderly, regular and responsible migration is replete with challenges. A clear-eyed view of what migration policy must attempt, and what it can achieve, is the necessary starting point but it cannot be the endpoint. A long-term commitment to improving life in countries of migrant origin from a human development perspective places UNDP and other development institutions in the centre of action to make migration a matter of choice—an innately human phenomenon to be accommodated rather than a problem to be minimized.

3 Work with municipal authorities to prepare for climate-related migration to cities and build resilience

Climate change threatens to disrupt current patterns of settlement, livelihood and almost every aspect of human endeavour. Migration can be a positive adaptation choice, or it can represent “choicelessness,” if people must move because they are unable to sustain themselves in their original homes. More and more people displaced by climate change are and will continue to be moving to cities. One specific problem arises from the fact that budget allocations and fiscal transfers to local governments are routinely calculated on the basis of the “regular” population (registered or determined by the last census) rather than the actual population. When that is the case, local authorities may be overwhelmed by a large influx of people moving in response to disasters or the adverse effects of climate change. Both the financial resources and the administrative capacity to address such situations must be augmented, consistent with UNDP’s work on decentralization and strengthening of local governments.

UNDP and other development partners should work with municipal and other local authorities to prepare to receive large numbers of internal and cross-border migrants and plan for their productive integration into the urban setting. Objective 2 of the Migration Compact calls on states to develop adaptation and mitigation strategies to build resilience in the face of natural disasters brought on by a warming atmosphere, both

slow-onset and rapid-onset. The compact's menu of actions on climate change is primarily reactive, but development agencies have a broader, proactive role to play in working with governments to mitigate climate change, in particular by developing renewable energy sources and building “green” infrastructure.

4 Invest in medium and long-term solutions spanning humanitarian and development work

Displacement has too often been met with a narrowly humanitarian response, focused on providing desperately needed assistance but

BOX 5.2 Specific recommendations for migration policy

A number of migration-specific recommendations follow from the empirical observations and analysis summarized in the body of this paper. Some of the most salient are the following; many are consistent with the recommendations of HDR 2009 as well as the objectives of the Refugee and Migration Compacts:

- Open legal migration pathways for migrants, especially to a larger number of poor migrants from poor countries, as they are likely to realize the most immediate and the largest gains from working in a rich country. An example of good practice is Japan's new policy to admit 345,000 foreign workers over a period of five years from the following nine priority countries: Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, the Philippines, Thailand and Viet Nam. This recommendation was presented in the HDR 2009, and again in the Global Compact for Migration.
- Encourage diaspora engagement with the origin country, especially by skilled and entrepreneurial members, including by facilitating circular migration by individuals and between institutions and companies in countries of origin and destination. Help governments build strong diaspora-engagement offices.
- Open temporary migration opportunities for temporary jobs. Some analysts and policymakers have concluded that emphasizing temporary migration is the way to make higher levels of migration acceptable in countries of destination. Clemens argues that it is wise to do so for another reason: It would give more people from poor countries the chance to earn income in a developed country than would be the case with permanent migration. As noted above, even as the US administration made attempts to reduce almost all categories of permanent migration in 2017–2019, it increased admissions of temporary, low-skilled workers. ▼

- Act on the long-standing recommendations to lower the costs of sending remittances and the costs of recruitment. The costs of sending money to countries in sub-Saharan Africa averages 9.3 percent—well above the global average of 7 percent and yet another example of the poor paying more for services associated with migration. Governments can also reduce the costs of travel documentation and regulate other costs, such as interest on loans to finance travel.
- Strengthen the social safety net in poor countries to reduce both inequality and migration drivers. The analysis from the DEMIG project showed that increasing public spending on education, health and social protection in countries of origin reduces international migration, which has been part of the dynamic of reduced emigration from Mexico. Other forms of social spending, however, could increase migration—for example, cash transfer programmes may increase people’s ability to migrate more than it reduces their desire to leave. ■

with little perspective, or funding, for longer-term needs—and opportunities. The Refugee Compact’s emphasis on refugee self-reliance and the needs of host communities and countries represents a more sustainable approach, and it is important for development actors to be involved in implementation. Given the long-term nature of most displacement situations, medium and longer-term thinking is essential now. UNDP has a strong comparative advantage in addressing mixed migration flows because its expertise spans humanitarian and development work.

A policy brief from the Center for Global Development presents a well-researched model for a medium-term response, maintaining the long-term prospect of safe and dignified voluntary return to the country of origin.²⁴² It is focused on the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh,

and takes a three-pronged approach to meeting the needs of the host community around Cox’s Bazar, the refugees and the host country with: private investment in local industries (including seafood, food processing and clean energy), skills development for local workers to prepare them for jobs in Bangladesh or abroad, and forest restoration to create jobs and undo some of the environmental damage wrought by the densely populated refugee camp, the world’s largest. In addition to policy changes on the part of the Bangladesh government, the proposal calls on international partners to coordinate their technical and financial assistance for plan development and implementation, through a medium-term planning group. Deeply researched, context-specific and responsive to local, national and refugee needs, this kind of initiative can provide a pragmatic way to make life easier and more productive

for refugees and their hosts, even if resolving the political cause of the Rohingya’s displacement is beyond its reach.

5 Make a more persuasive case for migration

When international organizations and governmental authorities try to counter negative rhetoric about refugees and other migrants, they usually turn to facts and figures that demonstrate the gains of migration to receiving countries and communities—particularly the economic gains. This approach has had little demonstrable impact in turning around negative opinions. Social psychology research of the kind summarized by Natalia Banulescu-Bogdan suggests that most people “resist information that contradicts their existing beliefs or personal experiences.”²⁴³ Effective public information campaigns need to take into account the ways in which people absorb, process, remember and accept information rather than simply supplying facts. Stories resonate more than facts, as do appeals to emotion rather than logic. People tend to be more receptive to information that fits the values of the groups or groups they identify with. Banulescu-Bogdan offers a list of “do’s and don’ts” to guide efforts to construct an evidence-based narrative around migration:

- Appeal to people’s values rather than just their economic interests
- Don’t lead with criticism of personal or group opinions but affirm the worth of the opinion-holder
- Give people a way out rather than insisting that they back down
- Don’t repeat misinformation even to debunk it; offer an alternative narrative
- Engage messengers from different political parties, communities and walks of life
- Work long-term to build a culture of critical thinking and thoughtful debate

It is also important to acknowledge the legitimate concerns of people who fear the impact of migration on their economic security or way of life, rather than dismissing them as prejudices. Often, migrants become the face of unwelcome change even when they are not its cause. UNDP and other development actors can assist governments facing a migration backlash to understand the roots of public discontent and construct strategies to address it effectively using both factual evidence and psychological insights.

6 Build coalitions among states and other stakeholders

Tackling the underlying causes of displacement and the negative drivers of migration is a task too big for any one country or institution to accomplish alone. That is why the Sutherland Report called for coalition-building among States and other actors (an approach that SRSR Sutherland called mini-multilateralism) that share common priorities around an issue or geographic area.

Within the UN system, the UN Migration Network provides a framework for such coalitions to form in the network’s thematic working groups, led by UN agencies. The urgency of the task creates a dilemma

between the patient gathering and analysis of evidence and urgent action. In fact, both must proceed concurrently, with enough flexibility built into action plans to allow for course corrections as knowledge and experience accumulate. The German development agency, the Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), and its implementing agency, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH (GIZ), provide ongoing action to relieve migration pressures and create productive migration partnerships, even as the federal government convenes a specialist commission on the root causes of displacement. The commission will develop proposals on how to address root causes, including specific recommendations for action, in a report to the German Government and Parliament by the end of 2020.

7 Foster innovation

Making an impact on entrenched negative drivers and underlying causes of migration calls for extraordinary

creativity on the part of policymakers and programme designers. UNDP's Accelerator Labs and the Migration Labs supported by GIZ in association with the GFMD are among the potential sources of badly needed new strategies, many of which might focus on local, community-based development. Prevention- and deterrence-based approaches to migration management have not proved effective, nor have development interventions focused on job creation (although valuable in themselves) delivered a quick fix.

It is time to take promising pilot projects like skills partnerships and triple-win initiatives to scale, and forge a new paradigm of migration collaboration that meets the needs of both countries of origin and destination, as well as countries of transit (many of which, like Mexico and Morocco, are increasingly becoming countries of destination as well). The new paradigm must also address the aspirations of migrants and create greater agency for refugees, IDPs and other displaced people to use their talents and energies even in exile. These are long-term projects, but they need to begin at once.



UNDP/Freya Morales

Annexes

Chapter 2

Annex Table 2.1

	1990			2010			2019		
	Total migrants (millions)	Share of world migrants (%)	Share of national population (%)	Total migrants (millions)	Share of world migrants (%)	Share of national population (%)	Total migrants (millions)	Share of world migrants (%)	Share of national population (%)
World	153.0	100.0	2.9	220.8	100.0	3.2	271.6	100.0	3.5
Human Development Category									
Very High	95.2	62.2	7.4	162.6	73.6	11.1	200.6	73.9	13.0
High	24.9	16.2	1.1	27.7	12.5	1.0	35.0	12.9	1.2
Medium	19.5	12.8	1.4	15.8	7.2	0.8	16.9	6.2	0.7
Low	12.2	8.0	2.8	12.9	5.9	1.7	17.2	6.3	1.8
UNDP Developing Regions									
Arab States	14.0	9.2	6.4	28.6	13.0	8.2	40.2	14.8	9.5
East Asia and the Pacific	3.4	2.2	0.2	9.7	4.4	0.5	11.4	4.2	0.5
Europe and Central Asia	18.1	11.8	8.8	14.4	6.5	6.3	19.2	7.1	7.7
Latin America and the Caribbean	6.5	4.3	1.5	7.5	3.4	1.3	10.9	4.0	1.7
South Asia	19.5	12.8	1.6	14.3	6.5	0.8	14.1	5.2	0.7
Sub-Saharan Africa	12.6	8.2	2.6	15.5	7.0	1.9	23.2	8.5	2.2
Developed countries	77.6	50.7	7.0	129.1	58.5	10.6	150.9	55.6	11.9
OECD	65.0	42.5	6.1	116.7	52.9	9.4	142.7	52.5	10.9

Source: HDRO calculation based on UNDESA (2019). Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2019 revision. <http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/>

Note: Human development categories are based on the 2018 Human Development Index: Low (HDI <0.55), Medium (0.55<=HDI<0.7), High (0.7<=HDI<0.8), Very high (HDI>=0.8).

Note: 189 UN member states for which HDI was calculated are categorized by human development categories. Each of 193 member states (plus the state of Palestine) is in either a developing region or a developed region.

Note: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has 36 members. <http://www.oecd.org/about/members-and-partners/>

Definition: International migrant stock: The definition of immigrant varies across countries but generally includes the stock of foreign-born people, the stock of foreign people (according to citizenship) or a combination of the two.

Chapter 4

ANNEX BOX 4.1**Objectives of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration**

- 1 Collect and utilize accurate and disaggregated data as a basis for evidence-based policies
- 2 Minimize the adverse drivers and structural factors that compel people to leave their country of origin
- 3 Provide accurate and timely information at all stages of migration
- 4 Ensure that all migrants have proof of legal identity and adequate documentation
- 5 Enhance availability and flexibility of pathways for regular migration
- 6 Facilitate fair and ethical recruitment and safeguard conditions that ensure decent work
- 7 Address and reduce vulnerabilities in migration
- 8 Save lives and establish coordinated international efforts on missing migrants
- 9 Strengthen the transnational response to smuggling of migrants
- 10 Prevent, combat and eradicate trafficking in persons in the context of international migration
- 11 Manage borders in an integrated, secure and coordinated manner
- 12 Strengthen certainty and predictability in migration procedures for appropriate screening, assessment and referral
- 13 Use migration detention only as a measure of last resort and work towards alternatives
- 14 Enhance consular protection, assistance and cooperation throughout the migration cycle
- 15 Provide access to basic services for migrants
- 16 Empower migrants and societies to realize full inclusion and social cohesion
- 17 Eliminate all forms of discrimination and promote evidence-based public discourse to shape perceptions of migration
- 18 Invest in skills development and facilitate mutual recognition of skills, qualifications and competences
- 19 Create conditions for migrants and diasporas to fully contribute to sustainable development in all countries
- 20 Promote faster, safer and cheaper transfer of remittances and foster financial inclusion of migrants
- 21 Cooperate in facilitating safe and dignified return and readmission, as well as sustainable reintegration
- 22 Establish mechanisms for the portability of social security entitlements and earned benefits
- 23 Strengthen international cooperation and global partnerships for safe, orderly and regular migration

Source: Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (2018)



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UNDP/Freya Morales

United Nations Development Programme
One United Nations Plaza
New York, NY 10017

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